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A REGULATORY BUDGET FOR THE PUBLIC
COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD
J.W. Verret*
ABSTRACT
The Public Company Accounting Standards Board (PCAOB) was
created by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 in response to the
Enron and WorldCom auditing scandals. The PCAOB regulates the
$20 billion annual auditing industry, which itself provides assurance
for the financial integrity of $27 trillion in outstanding global publicly
traded equity. The PCAOB is uniquely a quasi-private entity overseen
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which approves
its budget and must approve any changes in its rules. The PCAOB has
undertaken initiatives to attenuate the cost–benefit calculus of its
rules, most notably in a change from Auditing Standard 2 to Auditing
Standard 5, to reduce the compliance costs of auditor attestation of
internal controls required by § 404(b) of the SOX. This Article
provides the SEC with a regulatory budget rubric, crafted on similar
models implemented in the United Kingdom and Canada, to help the
SEC fulfill its oversight function over the PCAOB by tracking a
regulatory budget for the PCAOB.

* Associate Professor, George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School & Senior Scholar,
Mercatus Center at George Mason University.
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INTRODUCTION
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)
regulates the public-accounting auditing industry, which reviews and
audits the financial statements of all publicly traded companies in the
United States to determine whether there are material weaknesses. 1
The auditing industry also examines internal controls that buttress the
process of generating financial statements to determine whether that
process is subject to material weaknesses. 2 The PCAOB has an annual
budget of some $310 million (paid for by public companies and their
shareholders). 3 The PCAOB regulates a $20-billion-a-year
public-accounting auditing industry, which is responsible for assuring
the integrity of the financial statements of all public companies and
broker–dealers (effectively making the PCAOB responsible for the
integrity of most of the $27 trillion of public equity outstanding in the
United States). 4 This Article adapts lessons from regulatory budget
processes in other countries to develop suggestions for how a
regulatory budget could assist the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC) oversight of the PCAOB. 5 Unique issues in
measuring the costs and benefits of auditing regulation are considered,
and a literature survey of auditing academic research is offered. 6 The
Article closes with initial suggestions for the PCAOB to adjust its
regulatory priorities and alter the design of its approach to meet a
future regulatory budget initiative. 7

1. See Order Regarding Section 101(d) of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Securities Act Release
No. 8223, Exchange Act Release No. 47,746, 80 SEC Docket 144 (Apr. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Section
101(d) Order], https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/33-8223.htm [https://perma.cc/CLK5-ABT9].
2. See AS 2201: An Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting That is Integrated with an
Audit of Financial Statements, PCAOB, https://pcaobus.org/oversight/standards/auditingstandards/details/AS2201 [https://perma.cc/SF3F-WYWH].
3. News Release, PCAOB, PCAOB Approves 2022 Budget (Nov. 23, 2021),
https://pcaobus.org/news-events/news-releases/news-release-detail/pcaob-approves-2022-budget
[https://perma.cc/D864-SY42];
Accounting
Support
Fee,
PCAOB,
https://pcaobus.org/about/accounting-support-fee [https://perma.cc/6QT6-CU8M].
4. Market Capitalization of Listed Domestic Companies (Current US$), WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD.
5. See infra Part III & Part IV.
6. See infra Part V & Part VI.
7. See infra Part VII.
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This Article focuses on Section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of
2002 (SOX 404)—a particular rule implemented by the
PCAOB requiring that auditors attest to the viability of internal control
processes implemented by public companies—because that rule is one
whose costs tend to be both significant and discretely measurable.
Although the regulatory budget process suggested in this Article
focuses particularly on SOX 404, the lessons of this Article apply more
broadly to all of the regulatory activities undertaken by the PCAOB.
To be clear, this Article focuses on establishing an institutional
mechanism to measure and formally track the costs of PCAOB
regulations to assist the SEC in its oversight of the PCAOB. These
costs are primarily the costs to public company issuers and not the
compliance costs imposed on auditing firms themselves.
Paradoxically, auditing firms are likely to benefit from increases in
audit requirements because they have strong pricing power given the
level of consolidation in the market for large firm audits. It may prove
necessary to entirely omit the direct cost of audit firm compliance from
the process offered here.
I. SARBANES–OXLEY AND THE PCAOB
In response to nationally prominent accounting fraud scandals at
Enron, WorldCom, and a number of other companies, Congress
passed, and the President signed, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) into
law in 2002.8 This law enhanced regulation of the auditing profession,
required company executives to certify the effectiveness of their
internal control systems to maintain the integrity of their accounting
processes, and required annual external audits of company internal
controls for most publicly traded companies.9
SOX also created the PCAOB, a regulatory body charged with
overseeing public company audits. 10 The PCAOB replaced a
self-regulatory body that had previously overseen the auditing
8. Parveen P. Gupta & Tim Leech, Making Sarbanes–Oxley 404 Work: Reducing Cost, Increasing
Effectiveness, 3 INT’L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 27, 28 (2006).
9. Id.
10. Section 101(d) Order, supra note 1.
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profession through a peer review system and the promulgation of
auditing industry best practices. 11 The PCAOB is overseen by the SEC
because its rules and annual budget must be approved by the SEC.12
The PCAOB’s central functions involve registration of public
company auditors, auditing standard setting, inspections, and
enforcement actions.13
Chief among the SOX requirements are §§ 302 and 404(a) (SOX
302 and SOX 404(a)), which requires publicly-traded company
management to assess the effectiveness of their internal control
systems and report any significant deficiencies or material weaknesses
in their internal controls to their board of directors’ audit committee
and to their external auditor and § 404(b) of the SOX (SOX 404(b)),
which requires outside auditors to attest to management’s
representations regarding the validity of those internal controls and to
disclose whether material weaknesses exist in those internal controls.14
The SEC provided an exemption for smaller publicly traded
companies (less than $75 million market capitalization) from the
SOX 404(b) attestation requirement, which was subsequently codified
in the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010 (Dodd–Frank Act).15 Smaller companies that are exempt from
SOX 404(b) are still required to comply with SOX 302 and 404(a).16
The SEC expanded that exemption to include companies that make
less than $100 million in annual revenue. 17
11. Steven B. Harris, PCAOB Board Member, Background on the PCAOB, Address at the Kennesaw
State
Graduate
Student
Meeting
(May
16,
2013),
https://pcaobus.org/newsevents/speeches/speech-detail/background-on-the-pcaob_465 [https://perma.cc/Q9G6-4FJX]; Charles D.
Niemeier, PCAOB Board Member, Independent Oversight of the Auditing Profession: Lessons from U.S.
History, Address at the German Public Auditors Congress of 2007 (Nov. 8, 2007),
https://pcaobus.org/news-events/speeches/speech-detail/independent-oversight-of-the-auditingprofession-lessons-from-u-s-history_32 [https://perma.cc/C4FA-SVTG].
12. Section 101(d) Order, supra note 1.
13. John L. Abernathy, Michael Barnes & Chad Stefaniak, A Summary of 10 Years of PCAOB
Research: What Have We Learned?, 32 J. ACCT. LITERATURE 30, 31 (2013).
14. Gupta & Leech, supra note 8, at 30, 33.
15. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-582, INTERNAL CONTROLS: SEC SHOULD
CONSIDER REQUIRING COMPANIES TO DISCLOSE WHETHER THEY OBTAINED AN AUDITOR ATTESTATION
2 (2013).
16. See id. at 2, 8.
17. Press Release, SEC, SEC Expands the Scope of Smaller Public Companies that Qualify for Scaled
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One survey in the wake of SOX implementation found that SOX
was associated with an average fee increase of $2.3 million at the
average Fortune 1000 company. 18 SOX 404 was the most expensive
component of that initial cost increase.19 The initial auditing standard
that the PCAOB used to implement SOX 404(b)’s internal control
attestation requirement was Auditing Standard 2 (AS 2). 20 That
standard was criticized by the issuer community and by some at the
PCAOB itself as resulting in excessively high increases in audit fees
(relative to the pre-Sarbanes–Oxley environment), being excessively
duplicative and cumbersome, and being unlikely to help uncover
material weaknesses in internal controls. 21
The initial approach to SOX 404 implementation adopted by the
PCAOB under AS 2 was criticized as overly focused on process
controls, rather than an analytical approach grounded in risk
assessment of where internal control deficiencies were deemed likely
to arise.22 The SEC issued guidance in 2007 suggesting a move toward
a risk-based approach to internal control auditing. 23 The PCAOB
ultimately responded to pressure from the SEC with the adoption of
Auditing Standard 5 (AS 5), which embraced a risk-based approach
that resulted in decreased auditing fees. 24 Although the ultimate
reduction in auditing fees was expected, it was in no way metered or
grounded in a holistic economic analysis of the optimal scope of
regulation. The risk-based approach adjusts the scale of an audit
relative to particular attributes of each individualized client, like size
or complexity, that tend to serve as reliable risk indicators of

Disclosures (June 28, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-116 [http://perma.cc/2SZ9VV9P].
18. Gupta & Leech, supra note 8, at 28.
19. See id.
20. Mark L. DeFond & Clive S. Lennox, Do PCAOB Inspections Improve the Quality of Internal
Control Audits?, 55 J. ACCT. RSCH. 591, 597 (2017).
21. Id.
22. Gupta & Leech, supra note 8, at 35.
23. See generally Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Report on Internal Control over
Financial Reporting Under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act
Release No. 33-8810, 17 C.F.R. § 241 (June 20, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2007/338810.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TX7-SQ2L].
24. DeFond & Lennox, supra note 20, at 597–98.
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deficiencies in internal controls.25 Yet the amount by which costs were
reduced was entirely unknown at the time of the change. Regulators
were effectively reaching around in the dark in reforming regulatory
costs. The methodology suggested in this Article would allow them to
do the same thing in a far more robust and transparent way.
The SEC’s new management guidance was designed to encourage
management to take a new risk-based approach to internal control
certifications by allowing management to focus its determinations only
on those internal controls that were directly related to a risk of material
misstatements. 26 The goal of the 2007 reforms embodied in the
transition to AS 5 was to reduce compliance costs of SOX 404 while
maintaining effective compliance. 27 The SEC simultaneously
approved the PCAOB’s new AS 5, which took the same approach to
external auditor attestations.28
The SEC describes the benefits of AS 5 as “allowing auditors to
exercise their judgment, . . . scaling the level of internal control testing
to match the size of the company, . . . eliminating unnecessary
procedures[,] . . . [and] allowing auditors to use a principle-based
approach to decide the extent to which they can rely on work already
done by others.”29 In making that change, the PCAOB, responding to
calls from the SEC, implicitly conducted a review of the costs and
benefits of the prior regime and worked to reduce compliance costs. 30
A regulatory budget process described in this Article would formalize
this process, enhance consideration of tradeoffs to a PCAOB-wide
review rather than merely a review of one single regulatory level at the
agency, and allow the SEC and the PCAOB an opportunity to engage
in ongoing review of costs and benefits rather than relying on the
incomplete picture of conducting a review at a single point in time.
That particular change to an individual standard is highly
informative for this regulatory budget proposal because it provides an
25. See id.
26. OFF. OF ECON. ANALYSIS, SEC, STUDY OF THE SARBANES–OXLEY ACT OF 2002 SECTION 404
INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 17 (2009).
27. Id. at 1.
28. Id. at 17.
29. Id. at 18.
30. Id.
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opportunity to study the relative changes in costs and benefits from the
reforms; however, it does not suggest that discrete auditing standard
changes should be the singular focus of a regulatory budget. Changes
to individual standards or regulatory approaches remain a terribly
imprecise way to adjust regulatory costs. It was not clear, to the SEC
or the PCAOB, for example, just how the reform from AS 2 to AS 5
would change costs, and neither agency considered how that change
would impact the rest of the interrelated regulatory environment in any
methodologically transparent way.
Congress has called on the PCAOB to conduct a more careful
economic analysis of its activities.31 A member of the SEC has also
made similar calls on the PCAOB to conduct more meaningful
economic analyses.32 In the last ten years, the SEC has had a renewed
focus on the cost–benefit analysis of rule proposals, but self-regulatory
organizations (like the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA) or the PCAOB) have not done so in any binding way.
Although the PCAOB does sponsor academic research roundtables
and has hired economists in its new Center for Economic Analysis
(including noted economist Luigi Zingales), the economic analyses
conducted by those economists are not treated as a binding constraint
on agency action.33
The next Section will draw on lessons from a regulatory budget
process developed in the United Kingdom, Canada, and other countries
to develop suggestions for how the SEC might institute a more
rigorous review of the costs and benefits of the ongoing regulatory
choices made by the PCAOB.34
II. REGULATORY BUDGETING BASICS & THEIR RELEVANCE TO SEC
31. See Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. House Panel Probes Audit Watchdogs’s Economic Analyses, REUTERS
(Jan. 14, 2013, 4:12 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pcaob-congress-idUSBRE90D14I20130114
[https://perma.cc/9ZRQ-C24G].
32. Michael S. Piwowar, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at 2016 Conference on Auditing and Capital
Markets (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/piwowar-speech-conference-auditing-capitalmarkets-102116.html [https://perma.cc/6AXX-MCNH].
33. Staff Guidance on Economic Analysis in PCAOB Standard-Setting, PCAOB (Feb. 14, 2014),
https://pcaobus.org/oversight/standards/economic-analysis/05152014_guidance [https://perma.cc/6H5UY8MH].
34. See infra Part III.
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OVERSIGHT OF THE PCAOB
A. How Regulatory Budgeting Works
Regulatory budgeting is a methodology for allocating regulatory
costs to the agencies that impose those costs on the economy. 35 It has
been adopted by many Western countries.36 Most iterations begin with
a mandatory cost cut, typically of 30%, after which agencies are
required to maintain the status quo in regulatory costs, by eliminating
old regulations before new regulations are allowed to go into effect.
More sophisticated regulatory budget methods would begin with a
holistic economic analysis, including a cost–benefit analysis, to
determine the optimal level of regulatory costs for each regulatory
agency within the government.
Regulatory budgeting is designed to internalize the regulatory
cost–benefit analysis within an agency by creating an opportunity cost
to regulation.37 The process set up by regulatory budgeting is inspired
by the assumption that the agency has some incentive to adopt new
regulations; thus, it has an incentive to prioritize between new
proposals or otherwise to eliminate old or duplicative regulations to
make way for new proposals.38 In effect, the agency internalizes that
there are tradeoffs associated with regulatory approaches and ideally
selects those regulatory approaches that provide the greatest benefits
with the least costs.
Regulatory budgeting has been a focus of reform efforts in a number
of foreign countries as well as a focus of legislative reforms previously
introduced in Congress but currently not adopted. President Donald
35. See Jeffrey A. Rosen & Brian Callanan, The Regulatory Budget Revisited, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 835,
838–39 (2014).
36. See generally LAURA JONES, MERCATUS RSCH., CUTTING RED TAPE IN CANADA: A REGULATORY
REFORM MODEL FOR THE UNITED STATES? (2015).
37. See Rosen & Callanan, supra note 35, at 840.
38. See id.; see also Regulatory Budgeting as a Solution to the Accumulation of Regulatory Errors,
An Introduction to Regulatory Budgeting: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Budget, 114th Cong.
2 (2016) (statement of Patrick McLaughlin, PhD, Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Center at George
Mason University); see also Building a Regulatory Budget: What to Know and Where to Start, Event at
the
Mercatus
Center
at
George
Mason
University
(June
8,
2017),
https://www.mercatus.org/events/building-regulatory-budget-what-know-and-where-start
[https://perma.cc/SJ4E-WF6M].

Published by Reading Room, 2022

9

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2022], Art. 11

890

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:3

Trump’s Administration adopted a version of regulatory budgeting by
presidential executive order in one of Trump’s first official acts in
office.39 The general notion is for a government to create a regulatory
budget process similar to its direct fiscal budget process. The
regulatory costs passed on to taxpayers can rival the direct
expenditures of the government, and the former arises within
regulatory bodies that experience no constraint on those costs. As a
result, regulatory costs are biased upward and difficult to control.
Regulatory costs are also experienced by agencies themselves because
their own fiscal costs increase to conduct ongoing enforcement and
compliance activities with respect to previously adopted rules.
B. What Other Countries Have Implemented
Most countries have implemented the idea of starting with a baseline
of what regulation should cost for the year. 40 Some have started with a
requirement to cut costs, typically by one-third, by aggregating the
number of regulatory requirements (tabulated as the number of
mandatory phrases in regulations, or compliance costs, or other
estimates of regulatory burden, depending on the country) over a
transition period.41 After that time, most regulatory budgets adopt the
prior year’s cost as the baseline and require that new regulations be
accompanied by corresponding cuts in regulatory costs before new
regulations can go into effect. 42
More sophisticated regulatory budgets would have a legislative
body allocate cost budgets for each individual regulatory agency, but
those previously adopted in other countries have uniformly applied an
initial cost reduction and uniformly applied subsequent baselines. In
part, this policy choice was based on the cost of implementation and
measurement, a challenge that will be dramatically reduced in scale in
the specific context of the SEC’s oversight of the PCAOB. This is part

39.
40.
41.
42.

Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339 (Feb. 3, 2017).
See, e.g., JONES, supra note 36, at 15.
See id. at 14–15.
See id. at 1 n.3.
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of the reason that the SEC’s oversight of the PCAOB is such an ideal
test case for regulatory budgeting in the United States.
Regulatory budgeting is a bipartisan idea, previously endorsed in
President Jimmy Carter’s Economic Report of the President and by
former Democrat Senator Lloyd Bentsen. 43 Although inspired by ideas
similar to the ones calling for a cost–benefit analysis, regulatory
budgeting takes a somewhat different approach. Susan Dudley,
Director of the George Washington University Regulatory Studies
Center, describes a regulatory budget as an effective complement to
regulatory cost–benefit analyses because a regulatory budget allows
for consideration of tradeoffs among existing regulations, whereas a
regulatory cost–benefit analysis is typically performed only on one
particular regulatory proposal at a discrete point in time. 44
Some of the methodological approaches used in regulatory
budgeting in other jurisdictions were designed to budget for entirely
new regulations with which the government did not have much
experience. 45 By contrast, the regulatory approach taken at the
PCAOB does not typically involve entirely novel regulations; instead,
it is characterized by the ongoing application of previously adopted
regulations, interspersed with occasional new rules or rule
modifications every few years. On occasion, the PCAOB proposes
rules which would be classified more appropriately as new
regulations—such as the mandatory reporting of critical audit matters
recently adopted by the PCAOB and approved by the SEC—but even
those changes function as part of the existing regulatory tapestry
overseen by the PCAOB (this is often true of SEC rules as well). An
annual regulatory budget review is likely more useful in considering
PCAOB costs than the net present value of costs estimates utilized by
other countries in considering individual regulatory proposals. The
SEC has a unique statutory authority to directly regulate the PCAOB

43. Regulatory Budgeting and the Need for Cost-Effectiveness in the Regulatory Process: Hearing
Before the Joint Econ. Comm., 96th Cong. 2 (1979) (statement of Sen. Lloyd Bentsen, Chairman, Joint
Economic Committee).
44. Susan E. Dudley, Can Fiscal Budget Concepts Improve Regulation?, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 259, 265 (2016).
45. See id. at 261.
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and approve its budget, which leaves no doubt as to its authority to
institute a regulatory budget process. 46 Discussions about
implementing a regulatory budget for independent agencies more
broadly indicate that White House oversight of independent agencies
may spring from the President’s inherent executive power, but that
position is yet untested in the courts. 47
Canada began with a one-third reduction target for its regulatory
requirement budget. 48 Canada’s Red Tape Reduction Act then
instituted a regulatory budget process in the form of a “one-in,
two-out” rule requiring regulators across the federal government to
repeal two regulatory requirements for every regulatory requirement
added. 49 This process takes a macro-level and rough-estimate
approach to regulatory budgeting in which the status quo essentially
becomes the baseline after the initial system-wide reduction. That is,
regulatory requirements rather than regulatory costs are tallied, and
decreases in regulatory requirements are given half the weight of
increases to account for an assumed regulatory bias on the part of
regulators implementing the rule. 50 This approach obtained wide
bipartisan support in Canada and passed into law with an
overwhelming vote of 245-to-1.51
An alternative approach developed in the Netherlands—also used in
Norway and Denmark—estimated direct business compliance costs
and set a target of 25% cost reduction.52 After the initial cost reduction,
those regimes then transitioned to a static regulatory allocation or
baseline in which increases in regulatory costs had to be met with equal
reductions in other regulatory costs administered by the government.53

46. 15 U.S.C. § 7219(b).
47. See Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal
Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1489–90 (2002).
48. JONES, supra note 36, at 20–21.
49. Id. at 19.
50. See id. at 15.
51. Id. at 3.
52. Id. at 12.
53. See, e.g., id. (citing SCM Network, International Standard Cost Model Manual: Measuring and
Reducing
Administrative
Burdens
for
Business,
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatorypolicy/34227698.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQS4-7A5V]).
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C. Applying Lessons in Regulatory Budgeting to the PCAOB
The following Section argues that the Division of Economic and
Risk Analysis (DERA) of the SEC, which studies regulation, should
work in partnership with the PCAOB’s Chief Economist to take a
leadership role in setting and monitoring the PCAOB’s regulatory
budget. Canada tasked regulatory reform officials residing in the
country’s Ministry of Small Business and Economic Development
with the implementation of the regulatory budget. 54 In the United
States, that role would be best served by DERA, which has staff with
the economics expertise to track compliance costs and has done so in
past studies. The PCAOB’s Chief Economist55 might be tasked with
collecting annual compliance costs to provide to DERA. Accounting
experts at the SEC may provide additional input into the initial
regulatory baseline calculation, and auditing experts at the PCAOB
would have an important role to play in determining the appropriate
tradeoffs to make in meeting the regulatory budget. Even if a
direct-cost approach is more difficult to implement than the Canadian
approach, it would be easily adapted to the PCAOB’s regulatory work
considering the wealth of accounting academic literature focusing on
the PCAOB’s operation and in light of prior work by DERA doing the
same.
Canada’s one-third reduction target was partly informed by a small
business survey suggesting that the initial regulatory requirement
reduction target was appropriate. 56 Although DERA could perform
original econometric work to determine the optimal regulatory
baseline or allocation to the PCAOB, as well as the appropriate target
reduction in regulatory costs that the baseline would aim to
accomplish, surveys of market professionals might also inform its
determination.
Most regulatory budgeting approaches would begin with an
acceptance of the status quo and, going forward, would have agencies
54. JONES, supra note 36, at 20.
55. Dr. Nayantara Hensel, Chief Economist and the Director of the Office of Economic and Risk
Analysis,
PCAOB,
https://pcaobus.org/about/senior-staff/senior-staff-bios/dr.-nayantara-hensel
[https://perma.cc/QC3D-772Y].
56. JONES, supra note 36, at 26.
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subject to a regulatory budget limit for increases to the status quo
baseline. 57 This approach economizes on the costs of establishing a
regulatory budget, but such a limitation is unnecessary in the context
of a regulatory budget for the PCAOB. There is sufficient data on the
costs and benefits of PCAOB programs and the major requirements
the PCAOB programs oversee, which allow for DERA to conduct a
sophisticated analysis of costs and benefits and establish a more
refined baseline to measure regulatory costs at the PCAOB.
All regulatory budget programs impliedly use a status quo baseline
and take a rough estimate approach to account for the difficulty of
estimating government-wide costs.58 By contrast, a wealth of cost and
benefit data is already available in the SEC’s review of the PCAOB.59
The PCAOB sponsors visiting accounting academics to study the costs
and benefits of its rules, although the SEC’s DERA has already
published sophisticated survey-based estimates and literature-review
studies of the costs and benefits of rules enforced by the PCAOB. 60
This Article provides initial suggestions for how to operationalize this
information.
The Canadian approach obtained the buy-in of regulators once they
understood that, within the regulatory budget constraints, they retained
discretion to decide which regulatory approaches to prioritize. 61
Canada’s regulatory budget was informed by what was essentially a
pilot program in the province of British Columbia, which itself
managed to achieve a one-third reduction in regulatory requirements
and that was maintained through subsequent changes in political
leadership.62 Similarly, the PCAOB could be left to initially determine
the appropriate mix of regulatory priorities and approaches, provided
that it remained within its regulatory budget or was able to sufficiently
explain to the SEC the reasons for departures from its regulatory
budget.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Rosen & Callanan, supra note 35, at 846.
See id.
See generally O FF. OF ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 26.
Id.
See JONES, supra note 36, at 19.
Sean Speer, Regulatory Budgeting: Lessons from Canada, R ST. POL’Y STUDY, March 2016, at 1,

4.
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The government of British Columbia experimented with tweaks to
its methodology for calculating regulatory costs during an initial
two-year phase-in period. 63 British Columbia also empaneled an
advisory committee to provide input into the regulatory budget process
and cost estimation methods. 64 The PCAOB and the SEC both
presently hear from advisory committees on a regular basis and could
empanel an advisory committee to provide input on the PCAOB’s
regulatory budget. One further check on agency cost estimates would
be the incentives of outside groups to track those regulatory cost
estimates.65
Regulatory budgeting is buttressed by approaches designed to
increase its reliability—like applications of standard-cost estimates
developed in other countries, reliable technological innovations to
establish consistent cost estimates, and peer reviews of the estimates.66
Retrospective analysis of existing regulations has been used in other
countries as a simple way to come up with an appropriate baseline. 67
That does not require, however, that the status quo costs form the
regulatory baseline if a more reliable baseline can be established.
Although another important component of cost–benefit analyses is
retrospective review, it has proven difficult to encourage agencies
subject to cost–benefit oversight by the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to do so.68 The advantage of regulatory
budgeting is that it explicitly incorporates a form of retrospective
review.
Supporters of regulatory economic analysis generally warn that a
regulatory cost–benefit analysis only works if the administration
implementing it remains committed to the idea. Similar critiques have
been applied to regulatory budgeting in its role as an analogue to
63. Id. at 7.
64. Id.
65. Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., Promise and Peril: Implementing a Regulatory Budget, 31 POL’Y SCIS.
343, 355 (1998).
66. See Ellen G. Johnson, Andy Morton, Tim Flynn & James C. Musser, Congressional Budgeting:
Introduction to a Regulatory Budget 8 (U.S. House of Representatives, Comm. on the Budget, Working
Paper, 2016).
67. See, e.g., id. at 11.
68. Marcus Peacock, Implementing a Two-for-One Regulatory Requirement in the U.S. 16 (George
Washington Univ. Regul. Stud. Ctr., Working Paper, 2016).
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cost–benefit analyses. 69 If a subsequent administration is openly
hostile to regulatory economic analysis, the reform momentum will be
quickly stalled. This concern for maintaining momentum across
administrations has not played out in Western countries that have
adopted regulatory budgeting because the reform survived new
political parties coming into power. In contrast to these British and
Canadian government-wide initiatives, the SEC is a bipartisan
commission, with voices from both parties helping to maintain
momentum for evidence-based policymaking.70 This has been true of
the SEC’s commitment to DERA, and it has characterized a movement
toward economic analysis at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
from the 1970s and 1980s to today.71
In part, the professional norms of the economics division of an
agency, which are grounded in the scientific method, have helped
maintain this momentum over successive administrative changes at the
FTC and the SEC. This suggests that a regulatory budget process
would maintain a unique momentum if implemented by a bipartisan
independent agency like the SEC and developed under the auspices of
the economists at DERA and the PCAOB Office of Economics and
Risk Analysis.
Technological innovation in tracking regulatory compliance costs
can also assist the efforts to measure them. Canada developed software
particularly for the purpose of tracking regulatory costs as early as the
1990s, and more recently, a wealth of new software and
artificial-intelligence-based tools for regulatory compliance have been
developed.72 Uniquely, the underlying industry being regulated is the
accounting industry, which itself is the group of professionals charged
with tracking costs of all kinds in public companies, including the costs
they impose through their own activities.

69. Fred Thompson, Toward a Regulatory Budget, 17 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 89, 90 (1997).
70. See Current SEC Commissioners, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/Article/about-commissioners.html
[https://perma.cc/NJ8K-Y7NC] (Dec. 29, 2020).
71. See J.W. Verret, Economic Analysis in Securities Enforcement: The Next Frontier at the SEC, 82
U. CIN. L. REV. 491, 498 (2018) (citing William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition
Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 394 (2003)).
72. Thompson, supra note 69, at 95.
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Canada used an initial three-year implementation timeline to allow
regulatory agencies to transition toward a regulatory budget. 73 Any
transition window used in the SEC’s oversight of the PCAOB would
likely be balanced against the political reality that SEC Chairmen serve
five-year terms (or less), and so they are likely to seek an
implementation timeframe able to generate successful returns quickly
during their term.
The United Kingdom’s regulatory budget considered both
transitional costs and annual costs and used a discounted present-value
method to estimate the present value of future costs.74 The Canadian
approach uses a ten-year window for cost estimation in which the
future costs of each new activity required by a regulation are calculated
over the following ten years and then discounted into a present-value
calculation.75
In the PCAOB context, new rules are rare, and regulatory costs are
instead a product of the interaction of a small set of formal rules
administered by the PCAOB with more informal and subjective tools
like inspections and enforcement actions. As such, an annual cost
approach that does not include Net Present Value (NPV) calculations
is likely to prove more useful.
One of the regulatory costs specifically targeted by the United
Kingdom’s approach was what it referred to as “gold-plating,” or
“where a department implements a Directive so that it goes beyond the
minimum requirements, resulting in increased costs to business and
civil society organizations.” 76 Critics of cost–benefit analyses of
PCAOB actions, like the implementation of SOX 404, may argue that
the statutory requirement of SOX 404 makes ongoing cost analysis as
suggested in this Article inappropriate; but that misses the point
entirely. Consideration of any potential gold-plating of a statutory
73. JONES, supra note 36, at 20.
74. HM GOV’T, ONE-IN, ONE-OUT (OIOO) METHODOLOGY 8 (2011).
75. Controlling Administrative Burden That Regulations Impose on Business: Guide for the
‘One-for-One’
Rule,
GOV’T
OF
CAN.
(2012),
https://www.canada.ca/en/government/system/laws/developing-improving-federalregulations/requirements-developing-managing-reviewing-regulations/guidelines-tools/controllingadministrative-burden-guide-one-for-one-rule.html [https://perma.cc/H2TD-TMGJ].
76. HM GOV’T, supra note 74, at 6.
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requirement, for example by imposing auditing standards that exceed
the minimum required to implement the statute, is entirely appropriate
for ongoing cost analyses, as the United Kingdom experience
demonstrates.
D. Insights from the Academic Literature on Regulatory Budgeting
Some of the legislative regulatory budget proposals considered in
the United States do not contain an enforcement mechanism.
Commentators discuss some of the challenges associated with creating
an analogue to the anti-deficiency process in the fiscal budget to
enforce a regulatory budget. 77 Even to the extent that sanctions for
non-compliance are included in previously adopted regulatory budget
processes, they function to limit new rulemaking by the agency if the
regulatory budget is in deficit. 78 Such an enforcement mechanism
would not likely work well at the PCAOB because it rarely issues new
rules. The mere act of tracking the costs, and explaining any departure
from a baseline regulatory budget, can offer significant benefit to the
regulatory process.
Christopher DeMuth, lawyer and distinguished fellow at the Hudson
Institute, contrasts centralized, government-wide cost–benefit
analyses conducted by one reviewing agency, like OIRA, with a
regulatory budget process that forces each individual agency to
consider serious tradeoffs in assessing the costs and benefits of
individual proposals, and he argues that the decentralized approach of
regulatory budgeting can be superior. 79 A regulatory budget for the
PCAOB can supplement the SEC’s review of individual rule changes
by the PCAOB. DeMuth identifies the need to make estimates of future
costs when new rules are adopted and then establish a reconciliation
procedure to account for actual costs against prior estimates. 80
Although these reconciliations would be somewhat less frequent than
at other agencies, estimates from individual PCAOB proposals
77.
78.
79.
80.

See, e.g., Rosen & Callanan, supra note 35, at 850.
See id. at 854–55.
See Christopher C. DeMuth, The Regulatory Budget, 4 AEI J. ON GOV’T & SOC’Y 29, 30 (1980).
Id. at 31.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol38/iss3/11

18

Verret: A Regulatory Budget for the PCAOB

2022]

REGULATORY BUDGET FOR THE PUBLIC COMPANY

899

conducted during their initial review that year could be incorporated
into the PCAOB’s annual regulatory budget and subsequently
reconciled to actual costs.
Nearly all of the regulatory budget approaches recognize that
benefits are considered during the initial allocation of the regulatory
baseline (or regulatory cost allocation) and that only direct-cost
estimates are utilized in subsequent regulatory budgeting. 81 DeMuth
notes, “The short answer is that benefits would indeed be taken into
account—but early in the process, when the President and Congress
determined the size of each agency’s budget.” 82 Allocation of a
regulatory budget is analogous to setting a regulatory baseline and
measuring annual costs to determine whether regulatory costs are in
deficit.
If the link between SOX 404 auditor attestation and subsequent
accounting restatements is seen as a relevant measure of the benefits
of SOX 404(b) and the auditing standards promulgated pursuant to
that provision, it would be considered in establishing the appropriate
cost allocation or baseline but not in the subsequent annual regulatory
cost review. Similarly, stock price impacts studies of PCAOB rules,
and actions could be considered in the initial cost baseline but not to
determine the annual regulatory cost estimates. The baseline could be
periodically adjusted as well to the extent new information about
benefits comes to light. The effects that PCOAB rules have on
competition, and the level of consolidation in the auditing industry,
may also be relevant considerations. A full discussion of the
competition economics analyses that the PCAOB may consider
conducting as a component of regulatory economic analyses is beyond
the scope of this Article.
Net benefit calculations are not workable because benefits are not
as readily estimable as costs. Another reason benefit estimates are
excluded from ongoing regulatory budgets, and are only considered in
the initial budget allocation, is that agencies would have an incentive
to overestimate benefits so that all regulatory action would be
81. See id. at 32.
82. Id.
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represented as providing a net benefit.83 DeMuth notes the tradeoff in
determining which regulatory costs to measure. 84 Too wide an
estimate, measuring deadweight losses using “elasticities of demand
and supply” and estimates of agency risk aversion, “could swamp the
budgeting process in controversy,” but a budget process “limited in
scope would be easily evaded.” 85 The disciplining mechanism that
regulatory budgets provide—encouraging the careful weighing of
tradeoffs—only works if the agency itself has no role in assessing
benefits in the initial regulatory budget allocation.86
One study discusses multiple approaches to a regulatory budget,
ranging from the establishment of a macro-level cost ceiling for all
agencies, to setting targets particular to each agency, and to further
subcategorizing various types of costs. 87 The second or the third
options would be the only viable pathways for the SEC’s review of a
PCAOB regulatory budget. And DERA and the PCOAB Chief
Economist would need to make appropriate decisions that balance
leaving discretion to PCAOB in weighing tradeoffs between
regulatory approaches and setting sub-categories of the regulatory
budget to target areas of particular concern.
Given the high degree of attention to the impact of SOX 404(b) on
small firms, both in the previously adopted exemption in the
Dodd–Frank Act and in discussions about the extension of that
exemption, it is likely unavoidable that a PCAOB regulatory budget
would include sub-categorization targeting SOX 404(b) costs that flow
through to issuers based on some selected ranges of issuer market
capitalization. DeMuth observes that, ideally, a regulatory budget
would seek to measure the deadweight losses that result from
regulatory costs, rather than merely the compliance costs themselves.

83. See An Introduction to Regulatory Budgeting: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, 114th
Cong. 6 (2016) [hereinafter An Introduction to Regulatory Budgeting] (statement of Clyde Wayne Crews,
Jr., Vice President for Policy/Director of Technology Studies, Competitive Enterprise Institute).
84. See DeMuth, supra note 79, at 38.
85. Id.
86. See An Introduction to Regulatory Budgeting, supra note 83, at 17 (statement of Clyde Wayne
Crews, Jr.).
87. Lance D. Wood, Elliott P. Laws & Barry Breen, Restraining the Regulators: Legal Perspectives
on a Regulatory Budget for Federal Agencies, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 7 (1981).
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But he suggests that it would be better to include more macro-level
considerations in the initial cost allocation to an agency.88 Subsequent
cost estimates should then utilize only readily estimable direct and
indirect cost measures.
There is also an implicit recognition that regulatory budget
allocations begin with policy priors. 89 Part of the policymaker’s
decisions about an appropriate regulatory cost baseline may be
grounded in a desire to increase public participation in the securities
markets by increased smaller capitalization Initial Public Offerings
(IPO)—in a desire to assist financing of smaller capitalization
biotechnology and technology startups associated with higher
spillover benefits on the broader economy or a desire to respond to
particular high-profile instances of financial fraud that are directly
linked to an internal control failure.
Opponents of a regulatory budget that specifically targets costs may
argue that it would place the government into the business of setting
auditing fees or price controls; but that argument misses the mark.
First, it would not limit the ability of independent auditing firms to
raise fees on their own but only their ability to do so through a
regulatory design that mandates or encourages the use of a particular
service. Second, this approach would only target those costs that result
from the PCAOB’s regulations, not from auditing costs that predated
SOX and the PCAOB.
This Section has considered the basics of regulatory budgeting and
the approaches in the menu of available options that would be most
useful in the context of the SEC’s oversight of the PCAOB. The next
Section will link this with the public choice and agency institutional
design literature to demonstrate that a regulatory budget constraint is
well suited to the dynamic of the SEC’s oversight of the PCAOB.90

88. DeMuth, supra note 79, at 34–35.
89. See id. at 37.
90. See infra Part IV.
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III. AGENCY DESIGN THEORY AND PUBLIC CHOICE ANALYSIS
George Stigler, notable economist, and Sam Peltzman, Professor of
Economics at the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business,
observed that government regulation can be limited in effectiveness
because of political pressure and regulatory capture. 91 Regulatory risk
aversion is also cited as one of the reasons a regulatory budget is so
important.92 Regulators experience the fallout from a scandal that they
are seen as having caused, but they do not experience any of the
benefits from keeping regulatory costs low and encouraging economic
growth.93
The aim of regulatory budgeting is to resolve this issue by having
an outside party, which is more likely to measure regulatory costs
against benefits, set the initial allocation. 94 Those proposals rely on the
accountability that Congress and the President have to voters as
justification for their likelihood of being less risk averse.95 DERA at
the SEC can partly serve this external review function. The
professional norms of the economics profession can assist DERA’s
review.
Supporters of regulatory budgeting often buttress their work with an
appeal to the public choice school of economics, which explores how
regulatory costs can protect incumbent firms from competition by
serving as barriers to entry or by creating regulatory demand for their
services. 96 The establishment of PCAOB registration was itself
associated with a withdrawal by many smaller auditing firms from
public company auditing (although it is not clear from the literature
whether smaller firms tended to do so as a signal of underlying audit
quality).
91. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 6–7
(1971); Sam Peltzman, The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation, 20
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS, Spring 1989, at 1, 5, 48; Sam Peltzman,
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 240 (1976).
92. DeMuth, supra note 79, at 34.
93. See id. at 33–34.
94. See id. at 37.
95. Id.
96. See An Introduction to Regulatory Budgeting, supra note 83, at 7 (statement of Clyde Wayne
Crews, Jr.).
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Yair Listokin, Professor of Law at Yale Law School, argues that
bounded structures for federal institutions, like regulatory budgets,
work best when: (1) “there is relatively little variation in quality among
subjects evaluated by the agent,” (2) regulators “evaluate a large
number of subjects,” (3) regulators are “likely to be biased” relative to
the organization that oversees them, and (4) rules for regulatory
process are impractical. 97 Listokin describes these four prerequisite
factors as serving to “either increase the benefits of bias reduction or
decrease the costs of the rigidity imposed by a bound.”98
The first Listokin factor would seem particularly relevant with
respect to SOX 404 because the level of variation in regulated auditor
activity is characterized by relatively little variation with respect to the
primary component, as internal control audits are either satisfactory or
not (PCAOB inspections of non-SOX 404 issues can be more
heterogeneous).To the second Listokin factor, the PCAOB evaluates
thousands of auditors who themselves audit thousands of publicly
traded firms and broker-dealers. Thus, it would appear that at least
some of the key Listokin factors for effective regulatory boundaries,
like regulatory budgets, are met in this context. And the level of
subjective, professional judgment inherent in assessments by auditors
of internal control processes or other audited accounting
methodologies suggest that a rule-based approach is less useful than a
regulatory budget process for controlling regulatory costs. As
previously mentioned, the move from AS 2 to AS 5 was generally
understood to reduce costs, but that impact was far from certain. 99
Thus, such a change in audit standards would be well coupled with a
regulatory budget procedure, as initial estimates of costs could be
reassessed in subsequent reviews of the regulatory budget.
Listokin argues that regulatory constraints, like a budget, work best
where an agency is likely constrained by a biased approach in
determining the overall level of regulatory costs but can still prioritize
approaches undertaken within that budget. 100 This well characterizes
97.
98.
99.
100.

Published by Reading Room, 2022

Yair Listokin, Bounded Institutions, 124 YALE L.J. 336, 341 (2014).
Id. at 357.
See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
See Listokin, supra note 97, at 342.
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the PCAOB’s situation. According to Listokin, a regulatory budget can
be suboptimal in the event of a seismic shift in regulatory quality
indicators of the regulated entities. 101 That could be the case here; for
instance, if there is an industry-wide shift in the internal auditing
culture at firms. The passage of SOX and the events surrounding it
were likely associated with such a shift. It is not clear that this has been
the case in the post-SOX era; in any event, the SEC would retain the
ability to adjust the baseline cost budget for the PCAOB to respond to
indications of such a shift.
When the institution setting a regulatory budget has a high level of
uncertainty with respect to the “distribution of quality” within the
regulated population, Listokin argues, regulatory budgets can be
suboptimal. 102 That is not apparent in this sphere because Big Four
inspection results tend to be fairly homogenous. Listokin further points
to a need of stability in the underlying regulated population for
regulatory budgets to be most effective, in that “[w]hen the population
is stable, the principal is more likely to obtain accurate knowledge
regarding the distribution of quality.” 103 The clustering of audits
within the top five auditors, and further clustering of nearly all public
company audits within the top ten auditors, would further provide that
population stability.
The next Section will provide more depth to how the PCAOB’s
regulatory budget would be best designed and offer some thoughts on
how a successful regulatory budget program for the PCAOB might
inform the efforts to institute regulatory budgets more broadly. 104
IV. SEC OVERSIGHT OF PCAOB AS IDEAL TEST CASE FOR
REGULATORY BUDGETING: INITIAL QUESTIONS AND LEGAL
AUTHORITY
Regulatory budgeting supporter Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr. calls for a
smaller scale experiment in regulatory budgeting, essentially a pilot
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 358.
Id. at 362.
Id. at 363.
See infra Part V.
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program, to generate lessons learned and thereby ensure the success of
subsequent larger scale attempts at a regulatory budget.105
Although Crews supports a binding regulatory budget proposal, he
also notes that merely tracking the regulatory budget, even if it will not
bind agencies, could serve a useful transparency function.106 He also
argues that it could encourage agencies to stay within the budget even
when direct consequences do not follow.107 Samuel Hughes, a partner
at Ernst & Young, also observes the usefulness of regulatory budget
tracking for informing debates even when it is non-binding.108
A successful start with a regulatory budget at the PCAOB could be
extended to the other regulatory organizations overseen by the SEC
and further to Congress’s oversight of the SEC, Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, Federal Reserve, and other independent
financial regulatory agencies generally. There is also extensive
literature supporting the use of pilot programs in government as an
ideal way to incorporate evidence-based policymaking. An initial
problem to consider in regulatory budget implementation by executive
action is finding the legal authority to do so. This Article does not
suggest a legislative reform to implement regulatory budgeting in part
because the following Subsection argues such a change is not
necessary.
This regulatory budget proposal for the PCAOB could be
implemented in several ways. For instance, as the SEC reviews new
proposals from the PCAOB, it can consider the costs and benefits of
those new proposals against a historical pattern that shows the error
rate in the PCAOB’s own estimate of regulatory costs, thereby adding
a level of retrospective review of existing auditing rules to its
consideration of a specific PCAOB proposal, which would thereby
afford a more holistic cost–benefit analysis of the discrete change.
Relatedly, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (JOBS
Act) requires that a cost–benefit analysis be conducted before any new
105.
Jr.).
106.
107.
108.
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auditing standards are applied to Emerging Growth Companies, a
process that the ongoing PCAOB regulatory budget could inform as
well.109
The SEC’s decision to approve a rule proposal by the PCAOB is
governed by the same statutory cost–benefit analysis requirements that
govern its consideration of rules, as the language creating the SEC’s
review power utilizes the same “public interest” language which
otherwise triggers a cost–benefit requirement. 110 This ongoing
regulatory budget analysis by the PCAOB and the SEC’s review of the
regulatory budget and the analysis underlying the regulatory budget
could become evidence the SEC might cite in future SEC approval of
PCAOB reforms.
Section 109 of the SOX provides that the PCAOB’s annual budget
shall be subject to approval by the SEC but does not otherwise limit
the factors the SEC may consider in determining whether to approve
the budget.111 The SEC could review the outcome of the regulatory
budget on the same cycle when it approves the fiscal budget and
request explanations from the PCAOB for any deficits during that
process. Presumably, part of the reason that Congress gave the SEC
authority over the PCAOB’s budget was to check the expenses
incurred by fees assessed on public companies to fund the PCAOB’s
operations. Supporters of regulatory budgeting argue that a focus on
only fiscal costs underestimates the costs imposed on taxpayers and
the economy. 112 In this context, the regulatory costs imposed on
auditors can be passed through to their client firms, auditing fees can
increase because of auditing standards, including those affecting
SOX 404(b) attestation, and costs ultimately can in part be passed
through to shareholders in publicly traded companies. Thus, it would

109. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 104, 126 Stat. 306, 310
(2012) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(3)).
110. See generally Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. & 18 U.S.C.). “The Commission shall approve a proposed
rule, if it finds that the rule is consistent with the requirements of this Act and the securities laws, or is
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.” 15 U.S.C. § 7217(b)(3).
111. Press Release, SEC, SEC Approves 2017 PCAOB Budget and Accounting Support Fee (Dec. 14,
2016) https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-263.html [https://perma.cc/N2QU-W4GZ].
112. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 108, at 247.
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be appropriate for the focus of this exercise to be the costs passed
through to issuers, as increases in regulatory requirements may
become benefits to the auditing firms themselves.
This Section has demonstrated that the SEC has ample authority to
implement a regulatory budget at the PCAOB. The next Section will
consider some choices that the SEC will need to make as it establishes
a process for regulatory budgeting. 113
V. MEASURING COSTS AND BENEFITS FOR A PCAOB REGULATORY
BUDGET
The basic design of a regulatory budget process for the PCAOB
would be fairly straightforward. The SEC’s DERA could establish a
baseline cost estimate. Drawing on the wealth of evidence about the
implementation of the new SOX regime, the PCAOB’s exercise of its
inspection and enforcement authority and the adoption and alteration
of the rules it administers (including the costliest one, SOX 404(b))
weighing costs and benefits, DERA will establish a baseline estimate
of the appropriate costs.
This baseline estimate could be subdivided into categories
containing major direct requirements (SOX 404, auditor inspections,
etc.) and could be cross-referenced to categories based on firm market
capitalization (ranges of $75 million to $250 million, $250 million to
$700 million, and over $700 million are currently used by the SEC in
a number of contexts, although the SEC could and likely should
subdivide those ranges further). This would be relatively
straightforward with respect to the application of issuer rules like
SOX 404. After this initial determination, the PCAOB could be
afforded a transition period during which it would be responsible for
bringing regulatory costs into balance. After the transition period, the
PCAOB would need to stay within the regulatory budget or explain
any deficiency as part of its annual budget submission.

113. See infra Part VI.
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Yet, along the way, various methodological choices will need to be
made, including how to define and measure benefits and costs in this
context. The following Section will consider those issues in turn.114
A. Process Questions in Cost Estimation
Typical cost metrics for regulatory budgeting include the number of
regulations, the administrative burden of regulations, compliance
costs, or a larger estimate of macro-level costs to society (likely using
multiple equilibrium econometric models).115
British Columbia’s approach utilized a method of counting
regulatory requirements, in part by tallying the number of phrases like
“shall” and “must” in regulations adopted. 116 Canada used a broader
compliance cost approach somewhat similar to what the Office of
Management and Budget uses to determine Paperwork Reduction Act
numbers.117 That method, however, vastly undercounts the regulatory
burden, particularly for environmental regulations.118
The optimal approach to measuring regulatory benefits is using
opportunity costs and the willingness of an individual to pay for a
particular regulatory benefit. 119 In this context, stock price event
studies can provide helpful estimates of those benefits to the extent that
differences between groups of firms can be identified or unexpected
changes can be studied. Although the PCAOB may think of itself
institutionally as only concerned with the auditing firms it regulates, a
regulatory budget should force it to consider the costs of its activities
on issuers. “General equilibrium analysis” would provide the best
estimate of regulatory costs and benefits in setting a regulatory
budget.120 Even if this might inform the decisions made in an initial
114. See infra Part VI.A.
115. Peacock, supra note 68, at 8.
116. Id. at 9–10. For other measures of regulatory burden, see Bentley Coffey, Patrick A. McLaughlin
& Pietro Peretto, The Cumulative Cost of Regulations (Mercatus Ctr. at George Mason Univ., Working
Paper, 2016) https://www.mercatus.org/publication/cumulative-cost-regulations [https://perma.cc/8FBXV6J2].
117. Peacock, supra note 68, at 10.
118. See id. at 11.
119. Id. at 13.
120. Hughes, supra note 108, at 250.
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regulatory budget allocation, partial equilibrium analysis has become
a more generally accepted mode of analysis in determining indirect
costs. 121 Econometric studies tend to provide the best evidence for
regulatory cost budgeting. 122 Although the level of subjectivity of
model assumptions can call their reliability into question as part of
regular cost estimates, 123 model assumptions can nevertheless inform
decisions made in the initial cost allocation. Discrete cost–benefit
analyses of individual rules will likely not be sufficiently
comprehensive without an accompanying regulatory budget in the
PCAOB context; nor would a regulatory budget process that merely
estimates the cost of each individual rule (including a NPV of future
costs within an established window, as in Canada) and then sums all
rules together be sufficient.
The PCAOB does not publish many rules. To the extent the PCAOB
adopts new auditing standards, they do not function as individual
discrete rules but instead function as part of an interlocking system of
standards that govern audits. Further, the PCAOB’s regulatory system
is part of a wider system of indirect regulation through inspection,
independent auditors as gatekeepers, and class action liability for both
issuers and auditors that indirectly impact the regulatory system. These
challenges can be found in other regulatory areas, which is part of the
reason why a regulatory budget at the PCAOB will be an effective test
case for implementing regulatory budgeting. By infusing all of the
PCAOB’s regular activities and raising the entire agency’s sensitivity
to costs, regulatory budgeting can therefore be more useful, but only
insofar as costs are considered in a holistic way rather than rule-by-rule
as in the United Kingdom and Canadian approaches.
The costs of auditing are a product of (1) multi-dimensional and
indirect interactions between the PCAOB, an outside auditing
profession with significant market power, (2) internal auditors who
report to senior executives concerned about personal liability, (3) the
prospect of securities fraud liability for auditors as a result of audits

121. See id.
122. Id. at 272.
123. Id. at 273.
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that otherwise pass PCAOB inspection, and (4) industry bodies like
the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO) (which include PCAOB participation and input)
that set internal control and auditing best practices, which the PCAOB
encourages the auditing profession to follow.
Crews notes three common challenges in establishing a regulatory
budget, including agency incentives to underestimate regulatory costs,
difficulty in isolating costs that regulated firms would have undertaken
absent a regulatory requirement, and the difficulty of estimating
indirect regulatory costs. 124 In this context, the ability of outside
parties to estimate costs and the role of DERA in overseeing the
PCAOB’s estimates would address the first concern. The costs of
internal controls and auditing pre-SOX provide a measure of
comparison to address the second concern of measuring regulatory
costs against costs that would have been undertaken without a
rule—particularly because the post-SOX and PCAOB timeframe has
been associated with a marked increase in auditing costs (as measured
by the SEC Chief Economist’s methodology). The SEC’s prior
experience in measuring indirect costs of PCAOB requirements
through published studies suggests that the third concern is not
insurmountable. Furthermore, regulatory cost estimates do not need to
be perfect to be useful, just as fiscal budgets have an error rate but still
achieve their function of forcing policymakers to consider the tradeoffs
inherent in their decisions.125
Unlike many regulatory fields in which regulatory budgeting has
been implemented, the SEC’s prior studies of PCAOB and SOX
compliance costs suggests that the PCAOB may be an optimal test case
for regulatory budgeting.126 The costs are readily estimable and rely
on fifteen years of prior compliance cost data. 127 In this context, the
types of problems typically encountered when regulatory budgets

124. Crews, supra note 65, at 358.
125. See id. at 359.
126. See OFF. OF ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 26, at 96–97; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra
note 15, at 20.
127. See, e.g., OFF. OF ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 26; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note
15.
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contend with novel regulations and where costs are uncertain are not
an issue.
The United Kingdom’s regulatory budget process included
estimates of “codes of practice and self-regulation which are backed
by statutory force.”128 This suggests the importance of including the
costs of internal control best practices with regulatory force, like those
of internal control best practices organizations. This is particularly true
here, as the PCAOB participates in the COSO internal control best
practices organization in an advisory capacity and can therefore
influence its development of best practices.
The United Kingdom’s approach took care to select wage rates that
“external commentators can recogni[z]e as realistic.” 129 The SEC’s
2009 study of SOX 404 compliance costs used a reasonable estimate
of auditing wage rates. Although, if a regulatory budget requirement
were imposed, one would expect that the accounting and auditing
personnel regulated by the PCAOB might be a more accurate source
of appropriate wage rates than a generalized Commerce Department
survey.130
Changes to individual auditing standards implemented by the
PCAOB can reduce regulatory costs, as the switch from AS 2 to AS 5
clearly accomplished. This dynamic suggests that review of discrete
changes to auditing principles and cost–benefit analyses of individual
rule proposals might be helpful; nevertheless, such review cannot
substitute for an ongoing and holistic cost analysis that only regulatory
budgeting can provide and that can internalize the need to adjust
regulatory costs at the agency best equipped to impact those costs.
Studies have also documented that, although AS 5 led to a decrease in
direct audit fees, more recent increases in compliance costs have
largely eliminated those reductions with respect to overall SOX 404
costs.131 It is unclear from the empirical literature what caused those
more recent cost increases. Although a discrete regulatory analysis of
rule changes can be helpful, it will necessarily be incomplete if it is not
128.
129.
130.
131.
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supplemented by a more holistic approach to regulatory cost control
like that offered here. Regulatory budgeting can further serve as an
effective pilot program (for regulatory regimes that combine both
direct and indirect costs) for inclusion in a government-wide
regulatory budget as well as for a regulatory budget procedure for other
entities regulated by the SEC, like FINRA or the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board, and for other independent financial regulatory
agencies as well.
One open question is whether regulatory costs should be estimated
on a pro rata basis for the purposes of the budget. For example, some
of the SEC’s prior surveys of regulatory costs consider them as a
percentage of firm assets. 132 The regulatory budget could be set,
considering compliance costs, as a percentage of audited firm (issuer
and broker-dealer) market capitalization, of firm assets, or of firm
revenues. A pro rata approach could be used to implement a method
that weighs regulatory cost reductions for smaller firms more heavily
because smaller firms tend to pay much higher pro rata auditing and
attestation costs.
B. Process Issues in Benefits Estimation
Benefit calculations of the PCAOB’s work could include specific
measures of the quality of materials about which auditors ultimately
are required to provide a professional opinion, including the quality of
a firm’s financial statements, the quality of a firm’s internal control
systems, or a company’s ability to continue as a going concern (all of
which are interrelated). Three outcome-based measures tend to
dominate the literature on auditing: restatements, accruals, and going
concern opinions.133
Benefit considerations could take a larger macroeconomic view of
whether investors express more confidence in firm financial
statements, consider changes in how investors react to changes in
132. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE OFF. OF THE CHIEF ACCT., SEC, STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON
SECTION 404(B) OF THE SARBANES–OXLEY ACT OF 2002 FOR ISSUERS WITH PUBLIC FLOAT BETWEEN $75
AND $250 MILLION 37, 38 fig.5 (2011).
133. W. Robert Knechel, Gopal V. Krishnan, Mikhail Pevzner, Lori B. Shefchik & Uma K. Velury,
Audit Quality: Insights from the Academic Literature, 32 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 385, 397 (2013).
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financial statement estimates, or determine whether a firm’s cost of
capital is reduced, all as a result of PCAOB rules or regulatory activity.
W. Robert Knechel, Distinguished Professor and Director of the
International Accounting and Auditing Center of the University of
Florida Fisher School of Accounting, and others observe that auditors
are better at describing what audit quality is not, rather than at defining
what high quality audits must contain. 134 In considering the benefits of
PCAOB regulation, careful consideration must be paid to difficult
questions about how one measures audit quality. There is little
consensus in the academic accounting literature on this question. 135
One metric might be the incidence of subsequent material
misstatements.136 Yet not all misstatements are created alike; a prior
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report indicates that some
restatements merely result from minor revisions that do not arise from
flawed internal control processes.
Other metrics might be used that relate one accounting process to
another, such as incidence of findings of material weaknesses relating
to some other data point, like findings during PCAOB auditor
inspections. The challenge in these measures is that both rely on
subjective determinations. Knechel and others argue that restatements
are used as a measure of audit quality, in part, because they tend to be
negatively related to auditor expertise, auditor tenure, and auditor team
experience. 137 Further, shareholders and issuer clients tend to react
negatively to the occurrence of restatements at firms audited by a
particular auditing firm through either negative stock price effects or
by changing auditors.138
Discretionary accruals are at times also used as proxies for audit
quality, in part, because they are also negatively associated with other
attributes assumed to coincide with more effective audits, such as Big
Four auditors, level of auditor specialization, auditor tenure, and audit

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
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office size. 139 The general idea is that, although an individual
discretionary accrual may be legitimate, the magnitude of
discretionary accruals by an auditing firm’s clients indicates what
clients are more likely to be abusing discretionary accruals when
managing their earnings. Thus, the theory goes, a reduction in the
discretionary accruals of publicly traded firms correlates with an
increase in general financial statement quality, and a reduction in the
discretionary accruals for a particular auditing firm’s clients
corresponds with an improved audit process for that particular firm.
Some studies have found that SOX 404(b) compliant issuers were
less likely to utilize discretionary accruals, particularly if there was a
prior adverse finding of material control weakness. 140 Knechel and
others warn, however, that discretionary accruals may not be an
effective measure of earnings quality because auditors carefully
scrutinize them, and thus endogenous effects may distort them as a
measure of audit quality.141
Auditors are required to issue a “going concern” opinion, or an
opinion expressing doubt in their clients’ ability to avoid bankruptcy
within the next year, if they find that outcome likely.142 Thus, some
suggest an increase in the tendency to issue going concern opinions
means a more independent, objective, and thus higher quality audit. 143

139. Knechel et al., supra note 133, at 398. See generally Jere R. Francis, Edward L. Maydew & H.
Charles Sparks, The Role of Big 6 Auditors in the Credible Reporting of Accruals, 18 AUDITING: J. PRAC.
& THEORY 17 (1999); Jeong-Bon Kim, Richard Chung & Michael Firth, Auditor Conservatism,
Asymmetric Monitoring, and Earnings Management, 20 CONTEMP. ACCT. RSCH. 323 (2003); Gopal V.
Krishnan, Does Big 6 Auditor Industry Expertise Constrain Earnings Management?, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS
1 (Supp. 2003); Steven Balsam, Jagan Krishnan & Joon S. Yang, Auditor Industry Specialization and
Earnings Quality, 22 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 71 (2003); James N. Myers, Linda A. Myers &
Thomas C. Omer, Exploring the Term of the Auditor-Client Relationship and Quality of Earnings: A Case
for Mandatory Auditor Rotation?, 78 ACCT. REV. 779 (2003); Jere R. Francis & Michael D. Yu, Big 4
Office Size and Audit Quality, 84 ACCT. REV. 1521 (2009); Jere R. Francis & Paul N. Michas, The
Contagion Effect of Low-Quality Audits, 88 ACCT. REV. 521 (2013); Caren Schelleman & W. Robert
Knechel, Short-Term Accruals and the Pricing and Production of Audit Services, 29 AUDITING: J. PRAC.
& THEORY 221 (2010).
140. STAFF OF THE OFF. OF THE CHIEF ACCT., supra note 132, at 100.
141. Knechel et al., supra note 133, at 398.
142. AS 2415: Consideration of an Entity’s Ability to Continue as a Going Concern, PCAOB,
https://pcaobus.org/oversight/standards/auditing-standards/details/AS2415
[https://perma.cc/27YVLWY7].
143. See Knechel et al., supra note 133, at 397.
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Knechel and others also note that an auditor’s willingness to issue
going concern opinions tends to appear in the literature as an indicator
of auditor independence; however, they warn that the high rate of type
I and type II errors suggests that this is a flawed methodology for
benefits determinations (insofar as half of all companies going
bankrupt did not previously generate a going concern opinion from
their auditor, and 80% to 90% of companies receiving a going concern
opinion do not actually go bankrupt within a year). 144
Another approach used in the literature is to define certain financial
statement characteristics or auditor behaviors as positive or negative
and study their incidence regarding PCAOB rules or inspections. 145
Other studies consider attributes of the audit or auditing firms that rest
on prior assumptions of what makes for a positive audit, such as
auditor tenure, audit fees, auditor size or experience, etc. 146 Finally,
other studies consider financial impacts on audited public firms, such
as stock price impact, relative differences in cost of equity or debt
financing, or other financial statement data points or ratios. 147 The
2009 SEC DERA staff study relied upon survey data from stock
market participants, both issuers of financial statements and investors,
and other users of financial statements to determine their perception of
the benefits of SOX 404(b) attestations. 148
The last fifteen years of SOX implementation were not static. SOX
was adopted over a multi-year, phase-in period for some firms, which
subsequently received permanent exemptions from some of the SOX
requirements. The SOX adoption also involved an effort to rein in
costs through promulgation of new SEC guidance and a revised
PCAOB auditing standard for its most costly requirement. 149 This
timeline of changes, some unexpected, has proved a ripe ground for
econometric inquiry into the benefits of particular regulatory tools
utilized by the PCAOB.

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
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The PCAOB’s switch from AS 2 to AS 5 shows that it is entirely
possible to reduce the costs of SOX 404 compliance without impeding
audit quality. Thus, it is also very important that DERA consider
carefully the benefits from the existing regime where it can be
measured econometrically. Care should be taken to determine the
source of any perceived benefits in the auditing regime to determine
whether they result from specific regulatory tools (like SOX 404(b))
or whether they result from other regulatory tools used by the PCAOB
or requirements contained in SOX. PCAOB rules and regulatory
activity should also be reviewed to determine whether benefits
resulting from voluntary and non-regulatory business practices,
adopted to ensure the integrity of accounting and auditing systems, are
mistakenly counted.
Any confusion in linking benefits, particularly macroeconomic
benefits, to the wrong regulatory tool could significantly distort the
initial baseline cost allocation (some of any distortion could be
mitigated as the PCAOB prioritizes different regulatory approaches
and decides the regulatory tools to remain within its budget over time).
Care must also be taken to determine whether the perceived benefits
result from the operation of natural market forces that would operate
in the absence of the PCAOB. Further, even if individual practices are
found to be beneficial to some firms, mandatory application to all firms
may not be on net beneficial. For example, with respect to registration
of auditing firms and auditor certification of SOX 404(b) internal
controls, any analysis should also take into account that voluntary
registration and certification can provide an advantage over mandatory
requirements because the decision itself can establish pooling
equilibria, which provide independent signaling information. For
example, Professors of Accounting Asad Kausar and Nemit Shroff,
and late Professor of Economics, Hal White, examine where there are
benefits to an opt-in or voluntary approach to auditor inspections. 150
Once process choices are made as to how both benefits and costs are
to be measured, along with choices about how those benefits and costs
150. See generally Asad Kausar, Nemit Shroff & Hal White, Real Effects of the Audit Choice, 62 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 157 (2016).
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are to be defined, the SEC’s DERA can proceed to harness a wealth of
econometric evidence already available to develop a regulatory budget
for the PCAOB. A brief review of that evidence is contained in the
next Section.151
VI. PRIOR EMPIRICAL LITERATURE TO INFORM SETTING THE INITIAL
REGULATORY COST ALLOCATION OR BASELINE
Auditing academic research literature is highly developed with
respect to PCAOB standard setting (particularly SOX 404 standard
setting) and the PCAOB’s inspection process.152 The tools academics
and SEC officials have previously used to study auditing include
archival studies of data provided by the PCAOB or various auditing
professional associations, experimental studies, and survey-based
research.153
The empirical evidence explored in this Section will further
demonstrate that regulatory reform of auditing and internal controls
cannot be sufficiently accomplished by discrete changes in individual
rules or auditing standards alone because the less formal regulatory
powers, like individual inspections, also bear on the PCAOB’s
regulation of the auditing process as part of an interrelated nexus. This
is also true because an effective regulatory analysis demands a
retrospective component, which regulatory budgeting can provide. I
will consider in turn the evidence that would speak to potential benefit
estimates as well as potential cost estimates of PCAOB regulatory
activity.
A. Benefits
1. Impact of SOX Section 404(b) Adverse Findings on

151. See infra Part VII.
152. Abernathy et al., supra note 13.
153. Knechel et al., supra note 133, at 387.
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Restatements
SOX 404 and the PCAOB standards associated with it are heavily
researched by auditing academics partly because they represent the
largest component of regulatory costs associated with the PCAOB. 154
The academic literature has only considered a small number of the
auditing standards administered by the PCAOB, due to only a small
number of them having high-magnitude cost effects.155
One of the strongest data points which challenges the benefits
provided by SOX 404(b) internal control attestation is the finding of
Sarah Rice and David Weber that only 32.4% of financial restatements
during the timeframe of their study were preceded by a reporting of a
material weakness and that 68% of the time internal control audits
failed to predict subsequent financial restatements. 156 Rice and Weber
report that in one specific year, findings of SOX 404(b) material
weakness preceded only 13.6% of subsequent restatements. 157
Findings from Daniel Aobdia, Preeti Choudhary, and Gil Sadka
further support that SOX 404(b) reports are not effective at identifying
circumstances that will subsequently lead to a restatement. 158 Yet,
despite their limited ability to predict subsequent misstatements,
findings of material weakness are quite expensive. Firms that report
material weaknesses in internal controls but do not remedy them tend
to pay higher subsequent audit fees. 159 Such increases could result
from auditor market power, or they could be a result of higher costs
faced by the auditor, such as litigation risks or compliance costs with
other PCAOB requirements.
154. See Abernathy et al., supra note 13.
155. Id. at 44.
156. See Sarah C. Rice & David P. Weber, How Effective Is Internal Control Reporting Under SOX
404? Determinants of the (Non-)Disclosure of Existing Material Weaknesses, 50 J. ACCT. RSCH. 811, 814,
821, 826 tbl.2 (2012).
157. Daniel Aobdia, Preeti Choudhary & Gil Sadka, Why Do Auditors Fail to Report Material
Weaknesses in Internal Controls? Evidence from the PCAOB Data 2 (Ctr. Econ. Analysis, Pub. Co. Acct.
Oversight Bd., Working Paper, 2020) (citing Rice & Weber, supra note 156, at 814, 826 tbl.2).
158. Id. at 5.
159. STAFF OF THE OFF. OF THE CHIEF ACCT., supra note 132, at 88; Matthew J. Keane, Randal J. Elder
& Susan M. Albring, The Effect of the Type and Number of Internal Control Weaknesses and Their
Remediation on Audit Fees, 11 REV. ACCT. & FIN. 377, 378 (2012); Jacqueline S. Hammersley, Linda A.
Myers & Jian Zhou, The Failure to Remediate Previously Disclosed Material Weaknesses in Internal
Controls, 31 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 73, 76 (2012).
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There is some evidence to suggest a link between audits of internal
controls and various measures of earnings quality. Jeffrey T. Doyle,
Weili Ge, and Sarah McVay find that material weaknesses in internal
controls are associated with lower quality earnings reports.160 Other
studies caution, however, that this is a firm-specific question, and they
find that the benefits of SOX 404 audits depend on firm-specific
attributes, such as firm complexity, extent of analyst following of the
firm, or the prior propensity of a firm to lobby against the passage of
SOX in 2002 (the authors of these studies theorize that firms lobbying
against SOX tend to have higher agency costs). 161 Albert Nagy found
that issuers subject to SOX 404(a) and 404(b) are less likely to issue
restatements.162 He does not identify whether SOX 404(a) or 404(b) is
the chief reason.163 These studies indicate that, far from whole-scale
abolition of SOX 404(b) requirements, tailoring 404(b) requirements
to firm-specific attributes may serve to reduce cost while maintaining
quality assurance.
The perceived benefit from SOX 404(b) audits may instead be the
result of a far less expensive requirement contained in SOX—the
requirement that management self-certify its internal control systems,
which is contained principally in SOX 302 and partly in SOX 404(a),
and has itself been found to be associated with higher quality financial
statements. A substantial amount of literature indicates that
management disclosures regarding material weaknesses in internal
controls under SOX 302 are associated with negative stock price
reactions upon announcement, higher equity fundraising costs, and
higher debt costs. 164 The weight of the empirical literature suggests
160. Jeffrey T. Doyle, Weili Ge & Sarah McVay, Accruals Quality and Internal Control over Financial
Reporting, 82 ACCT. REV. 1141, 1166 (2007).
161. Cindy R. Alexander, Scott W. Bauguess, Gennaro Bernile, Yoon-Ho Alex Lee & Jennifer
Marietta-Westberg, Economic Effects of SOX Section 404 Compliance: A Corporate Insider Perspective,
56 J. ACCT. & ECON. 267, 271 (2013).
162. Albert L. Nagy, Section 404 Compliance and Financial Reporting Quality, 24 ACCT. HORIZONS
441, 453 (2010).
163. See generally id.
164. Messod Daniel Beneish, Mary Brooke Billings & Leslie D. Hodder, Internal Control Weaknesses
and Information Uncertainty, 83 ACCT. REV. 665, 693 (2008); Jacqueline S. Hammersley, Linda A. Myers
& Catherine Shakespeare, Market Reactions to the Disclosure of Internal Control Weaknesses and to the
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that the managerial certification regime under SOX 404(a) has been
far more effective than attestation under SOX 404(b) in providing
benefits at a reasonable cost.
A recent paper by Gerald Lobo and others finds that SOX 302’s
material weakness disclosures are positively associated with the
propensity of a firm’s stock price to unexpectedly crash. 165 More
significantly, after controlling for the predictive power of SOX 302
material weakness disclosures, they find that SOX 404 material
weakness disclosures provided no statistically significant benefit in
predicting crash risk.166 This suggests that SOX 302 may be a far more
effective
alternative
than SOX 404(b)
and
even
more
than SOX 404(a). Messod Daniel Beneish, Mary Brooke Billings, and
Leslie D. Hodder also find increases in equity funding costs for firms
reporting SOX 302 material weaknesses but not for firms reporting
only SOX 404 material weaknesses. 167
Some research suggests that auditors tend to find internal control
weaknesses with more frequency than managers.168 Citing that fact to
support the benefits from SOX 404 attestations assumes that all
findings of material control weaknesses are legitimate. A contrary
perspective could simply be that auditors tend to apply that label with
more frequency, particularly because findings of material control
weaknesses are associated with audit fee increases in subsequent
audits.
Importantly, evidence from the PCAOB’s reform of AS 2 to AS 5
indicates that changes to the SOX 404(b) attestation regime designed
to further decrease costs do not necessarily result in a concomitant

Characteristics of Those Weaknesses Under Section 302 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, 13 REV.
ACCT. STUD., 141, 146–47 (2008); Hollis Ashbaugh-Skaife, Daniel W. Collins, William R. Kinney, Jr. &
Ryan Lafond, The Effect of SOX Internal Control Deficiencies on Firm Risk and Cost of Equity, 47 J.
ACCT. RSCH. 1, 15–16 (2009); Dan Dhaliwal, Chris Hogan, Robert Trezevant & Michael Wilkins, Internal
Control Disclosures, Monitoring, and the Cost of Debt, 86 ACCT. REV. 1131, 1152 (2011); Jeong-Bon
Kim, Byron Y. Song & Liandong Zhang, Internal Control Weakness and Bank Loan Contracting:
Evidence from SOX Section 404 Disclosures, 86 ACCT. REV. 1157, 1159 (2011).
165. Gerald Lobo, Chong Wang, Xiaoou Yu & Yuping Zhao, Material Weakness in Internal Controls
and Stock Price Crash Risk, 35. J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 106, 109 (2020).
166. Id.
167. Beneish et al., supra note 164, at 666–67.
168. See STAFF OF THE OFF. OF THE CHIEF ACCT., supra note 132, at 97.
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reduction in benefits associated with SOX 404(b) audits. Rajib
Doogar, Padmakumar Sivadasan, and Ira Solomon find that the switch
from AS 2 to AS 5 was associated with a decrease in audit fees,
primarily for smaller audit clients, and that the switch was not
associated with an increase in fraud risk, in part, because the audit fees
and audit complexity of much larger firm clients remained constant
over that time. 169 Dechun Wang and Jian Zhou similarly find no
decrease in audit quality as a result of AS 5.170 This suggests that one
way in which the PCAOB may be able to maintain a regulatory budget
would be to better tailor the costs of SOX 404(b) audit expectations to
the size of the issuer being audited.
There was a “downward trend” in adverse internal control opinions
from 2005–2009, which led some critics of the reform to speculate that
auditing firms were failing to implement the standard properly. 171
Aobdia and others counter the argument that AS 5 led to a reduction
in identification of material weaknesses by examining proprietary data
at the PCAOB regarding auditor findings of significant deficiencies in
internal controls (a lesser grade than material weaknesses and not
required to be publicly disclosed unless it aggregates with other
significant deficiencies to form a material weakness). 172 They find that
auditor identifications of significant deficiencies are not associated
with subsequent restatements; thus, auditors do not consistently under
classify material weaknesses as a result of AS 5. 173 Furthermore,
changes in restatements by both exempt and nonexempt firms from
2005 to 2011 follow a similar pattern of sustained downward
trajectory.174
Mark L. DeFond and Clive S. Lennox find that, subsequent to the
PCAOB’s implementation of AS 5, PCAOB inspectors gave
heightened focus to internal controls in their inspection efforts, and as
169. Rajib Doogar, Padmakumar Sivadasan & Ira Solomon, The Regulation of Public Company
Auditing: Evidence from the Transition to AS5, 48 J. ACCT. RSCH. 795, 811 (2010).
170. Dechun Wang & Jian Zhou, The Impact of PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5 on Audit Fees and
Audit Quality, 26 ACCT. HORIZONS 493, 507 (2012).
171. DeFond & Lennox, supra note 20, at 592.
172. See Aobdia et al., supra note 157, at 8–10.
173. See id. at 4–5.
174. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 15, at 14 & fig.1.
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a result of this documented heightened focus, auditors responded with
a concomitant increase in adverse internal control opinions.175 More
specifically, they find that when PCAOB inspection reports find
problems in internal audit processes, audit firms respond by
subsequently increasing the rate at which they find client internal
controls contain material deficiencies and that increase in the rate of
material deficiencies is associated with an increase in the ability of
internal-control material-weaknesses findings to predict subsequent
restatements.176 This response by the PCAOB did not fully undermine
the objective underlying the switch to AS 5 initially because costs did
decrease substantially. On the other hand, it may explain a subsequent
increase in SOX 404 costs in more recent years.
This suggests that the PCAOB already has the power to attenuate
regulatory costs through multiple avenues. Regulatory budgeting
would help the PCAOB do so in a more formal, transparent, and
systematized way. This dynamic outcome further bolsters the case for
regulatory budgeting as it both demonstrates how the PCAOB’s
regulatory initiatives are all interrelated and that the PCAOB can shift
regulatory initiatives to maintain audit quality to remain within the
regulatory cost allocation imposed by the SEC.
Zvi Singer and Haifeng You compare Canadian firms that
voluntarily comply with SOX 404 against exempted U.S. firms and
find that firms that voluntarily complied experienced fewer
restatements. 177 Yet it is unclear from that evidence whether
mandatory SOX 404 compliance would result in the same benefits or
whether the signaling function of voluntary compliance was the source
of the benefit. A study by the SEC’s Chief Accountant in 2011
determined that SOX 404(b) attestation has been beneficial by pointing
to the fact that restatement rates for exempt filers are higher than those
for firms subject to SOX 404(b).178 A GAO study comparing public
companies exempt from SOX 404(b) attestation and companies
175. DeFond & Lennox, supra note 20, at 594, 604 tbl.1.
176. Id. at 623.
177. Zvi Singer & Haifeng You, The Effect of Section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act on Earnings
Quality, 26 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 556, 564–65 (2011).
178. STAFF OF THE OFF. OF THE CHIEF ACCT., supra note 132, at 98.
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subject to it notes that, on a per capita basis, the number of firms
restating financials in each group is proportional to the share that each
represents of all public companies. 179 Companies subject to SOX
404(b) auditor attestation restate their financials with the same
frequency as companies that are exempt from the requirement, and
they tend to do so for similar reasons. 180 This 2013 determination by
the GAO, which was conducted pursuant to a Dodd–Frank Act
mandate, directly calls into question findings in the 2011 SEC Chief
Accountant study.181 The GAO also determined that a modest increase
in restatements in 2010 and 2011 was principally due to revision
restatements, which they describe as restatements which “do not
undermine reliance on past financials and are less disruptive to the
market.”182 The SEC’s 2011 study was also directly countered by a
response from a 2013 GAO study which found that on a per capita
basis there is in fact no discernable difference between SOX 404(b)
exempt and non-SOX 404(b) exempt issuers with respect to
restatements.183
The SEC’s 2009 Chief Economist survey also obtained feedback
from both company management and users of financial statements to
determine their perception of the benefits obtained from SOX 404.184
Users of financial statements responded to the SEC’s survey that they
found that SOX 404 substantially increased their confidence in the
integrity of company annual reporting. 185 They did not, however, see
any changes in their perception of the benefits from SOX 404 over
time. 186 The SEC noted how this demonstrates that the SOX 404
reforms in the switch to AS 5 did result in a decrease in user
perceptions of audit effectiveness. 187 The survey, combined with the
literature on the move to AS 5 surveyed in this Article, demonstrates

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Published by Reading Room, 2022

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 15, at 12.
Id.
Id. at 3, 12, 33.
Id. at 13.
Id.
OFF. OF ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 26, at 6–8.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.

43

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2022], Art. 11

924

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:3

it is also possible to decrease compliance costs without reducing user
perceptions of audit effectiveness with measured adjustments to the
SOX 404(b) regime.
Company respondents overall found that SOX 404 compliance costs
exceeded the benefits associated with them. 188 The SEC 2009 survey
noted that “44[%] of respondents from U.S. companies indicated
that [SOX] 404 requirements prompted their companies to seriously or
at least somewhat consider going private.” 189 Seventy percent of
smaller companies in particular indicated that they considered going
private as a result of SOX 404 requirements. 190 The majority of
respondents surveyed found that SOX 404 was not associated with any
benefits in each of the following categories: to their firm’s ability to
raise capital, increase investor confidence in company financial
information, or increase company value generally. 191
A GAO survey found company officials responded positively when
asked whether auditor attestation provided their company with direct
benefits, with 80% suggesting it improved their company’s internal
control structure.192 A large majority, however, responded that it did
not provide indirect benefits to affected companies, with 16%
responding that it improved the company’s overall value and 16%
saying it improved the company’s ability to raise capital. 193 Although
the survey respondents could be mistaken, these findings are consistent
with an empirical study finding that the net effect of auditor attestation
on small firms was negative. 194 Other studies have nevertheless found
an empirical link between auditor attestation and investor
confidence.195

188. Id. at 61.
189. Id. at 66.
190. OFF. OF ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 26, at 66.
191. Id. at 6.
192. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 15, at 25.
193. Id. at 26 tbl.6.
194. See, e.g., Peter Iliev, The Effect of SOX Section 404: Costs, Earnings Quality, and Stock Prices,
65 J. FIN. 1163, 1166 (2010).
195. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 15, at 31 (citing Cory A. Cassell, Linda A. Myers
& Jian Zhou, The Effects of Voluntary Internal Control Audits on the Cost of Capital (Working Paper,
2013)).
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Even if a survey-based methodology may prove useful to estimate
compliance costs, once bias propensity is controlled for, it is of limited
value to determine benefits. Even to the extent that survey respondents
noted value-enhancing aspects, the 2009 survey was not able to
quantify those qualitative observations. Surveys cannot estimate user
benefits because they cannot determine a user’s willingness to pay for
the benefit and thereby cannot estimate their increased consumer
surplus resulting from the regulation.
This brief summary of the prior literature on SOX 404 and related
provisions indicates that the academic debates in the auditing literature
over the role and potential benefits of SOX 404 are not likely to end
anytime soon. The wealth of the evidence suggests, however, that
careful attention to SOX 404 in a regulatory cost allocation to the
PCAOB is warranted because the benefits of SOX and the PCAOB as
a whole may be presently misperceived as flowing from the more
expensive SOX 404(b), when in fact, for some groups of firms and in
some circumstances, those benefits result from other SOX
requirements and other regulatory tools utilized by the PCAOB.
This survey also demonstrates that attenuation of the costs of
SOX 404(b), as the PCAOB and SEC have already done with the
switch from AS 2 to AS 5, can reduce cost without reducing benefit or
even the perception of those benefits in the investor community. The
PCAOB could tailor the costs of SOX 404(b) to firm type, size, and
complexity through guidance documents indicating inspection
expectations to meet a reasonable regulatory budget suggested in this
Article. The move from AS 2 to AS 5 already provides a roadmap for
how to accomplish this objective.
2. Macroeconomic Benefits from SOX Generally
There is some macroeconomic evidence to suggest generally
beneficial results from the adoption of SOX and the creation of the
PCAOB, although care must be taken not to confuse this with an
analysis of whether any one individual feature of the PCAOB’s
activities (such as SOX 404(b) standard setting) is the source of the
benefit. For example, Brandon Gipper, Christian Leuz, and Mark G.
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Maffett find that investor reaction to earnings announcements was
much stronger after the adoptions of SOX and the creation of the
PCAOB than before. 196 Some event studies of SOX passage find
positive abnormal shareholder returns associated with passage of the
law. 197 Other studies show that SOX generally was associated with
“lower equity betas and higher stock liquidity.”198 Nemit Schroff finds
that the increase in auditor oversight resulting from the adoption of
SOX and the creation of the PCAOB resulted in a 0.5% increase in
capital raising.199 Evidence also suggests that investors and investor
analysts respond to findings of material weaknesses in internal
controls. 200 In contrast, Maria Ogneva, K.R. Subramanyam, and K.
Raghunandan found no statistically significant differences in the cost
of raising equity capital between firms that do and those that do not
previously report internal control weaknesses. 201 Some studies find
that an auditor finding of internal control deficiencies increases the
cost of financing, but one contrary paper suggests that when
controlling for basic firm characteristics that eliminate endogeneity,
the differential disappears. 202 Attention to the macro-level effects of
regulation can be useful, but they are not the primary focus of this
regulatory budget process, for reasons discussed above.
3. Benefits from PCAOB Inspection Regime, Enforcement, and

196. See generally Brandon Gipper, Christian Leuz & Mark G. Maffett, Public Oversight and Reporting
Credibility: Evidence from the PCAOB Audit Inspection Regime (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working
Paper No. 453/2015, 2019).
197. Alexander et al., supra note 161, at 284.
198. Id. at 269.
199. Nemit Shroff, Does Auditor Regulatory Oversight Affect Corporate Financing and Investment
Decisions?
1 (July 2017)
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.rotman.utoronto.ca//media/Files/Programs-and-Areas/Accounting/Conference-2017/Nemit-Shroff2017711.pdf?la=en&hash=C9146C5BAE344C63280E61153C601164C4DD09B9
[https://perma.cc/N9AQ-5URK].
200. STAFF OF THE OFF. OF THE CHIEF ACCT., supra note 132, at 103.
201. Maria Ogneva, K.R. Subramanyam & K. Raghunandan, Internal Control Weakness and Cost of
Equity: Evidence from SOX Section 404 Disclosures, 82 ACCT. REV. 1255, 1256 (2007).
202. STAFF OF THE OFF. OF THE CHIEF ACCT., supra note 132, at 101 n.247 (citing Ogneva et al., supra
note 201, at 1255).
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Auditor Independence Rules
The PCAOB annually inspects audit firms with at least 100 clients
and inspects other public company audit firms once every three
years.203 Auditors have expressed in interviews that adverse inspection
findings result merely from differences in professional judgment and
not, in fact, from lack of audit quality. 204 There is, however, substantial
evidence to suggest benefits from the PCAOB’s inspection regime.
Aobdia utilizes restatements and the tendency to meet or beat earnings
thresholds as indicia of poor financial accounting and concludes that
there is a strong association between adverse findings from a PCAOB
inspection and the incidence of those indicia of poor quality among
firms audited by that auditor. 205 This assumes, as explored earlier, that
these indicators, like restatements and tendency to meet or beat
forecasts, are accepted as appropriate indicators of audit quality that
are not driven by endogenous effects (such as an increase in auditor
pressure to restate from bias or risk aversion). Although he also
examines going concern opinions as another indicator of accounting
quality, Aobdia does not find any association between propensity to
provide going concern opinions and adverse PCAOB audit findings.206
Other studies have shown a link between PCAOB audit inspections
and indicia of audit quality like going concern opinions.207
Auditors are required to provide a going concern report if they
believe a company may not survive for twelve additional months.208
Studies cited in the previous paragraph of PCAOB regulations and
inspections have suggested that a higher incidence of auditors willing
to provide going concern reports is indicative of higher audit quality. 209
Although, at the same time, it could also be simply indicative of risk
203. Clive Lennox & Jeffrey Pittman, Auditing the Auditors: Evidence on the Recent Reforms to the
External Monitoring of Audit Firms, 49 J. ACCT. & ECON. 84, 87 (2010).
204. DeFond & Lennox, supra note 20, at 593.
205. Daniel Aobdia, Do Practitioner Assessments Agree with Academic Proxies for Audit Quality?
Evidence from PCAOB and Internal Inspections, 67 J. ACCT. & ECON. 144, 145, 150 (2019).
206. See id. at 146–47.
207. See, e.g., Phillip T. Lamoreaux, Does PCAOB Inspection Access Improve Audit Quality? An
Examination of Foreign Firms Listed in the United States, 61 J. ACCT. & ECON. 313, 317 (2016).
208. Kathrine A. Gunny & Tracey Chunqi Zhang, PCAOB Inspection Reports and Audit Quality, 32 J.
ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 136, 152 (2013).
209. See, e.g., Aobdia, supra note 205.
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aversion by auditors and, as mentioned previously in this Article,
going concern opinions do a very poor job of predicting subsequent
bankruptcy and are subject to both high Type I error rates and high
Type II error rates.
Joseph Carcello, Carl Hollingsworth, and Stacy A. Mastrolia find
that incidence of PCAOB inspections improves audit quality among
Big Four auditors, defined as a reduction in incidence of abnormal
accruals. 210 Kathrine A. Gunny and Tracey Chunqi Zhang compare
auditors inspected annually (those who audit more than 100 public
firms) against auditors inspected every three years and find that
adverse audit inspection findings for triennially inspected auditors are
associated with higher abnormal accruals and higher incidences of
restatement among those firms’ clients.211 At the same time, they also
find that adverse reports among annually inspected auditors do not
distinguish audit quality according to the two quality metrics they
use.212 Their findings suggest PCAOB inspections add value, but only
among audit firms with fewer than 100 public-company clients who
are the subject of the triennial inspections. They also find that annually
inspected auditors tend to be associated with higher quality audits than
even the highest rated triennially inspected auditors, which is in line
with a prior study finding that larger auditors tend to be associated with
much higher quality audits.213
Phillip T. Lamoreaux studies the differences in PCAOB access to
foreign auditors and finds that the PCAOB’s ability to inspect an
auditing firm is associated with an increased probability of issuing a
going concern opinion214 as well as with an increase in management
reported material weaknesses under SOX 302 or SOX 404(a) but not
with a change in auditor reported weaknesses under SOX 404(b).215
The benefits of the PCAOB’s inspection program should be judged
relative to the peer-review program that preceded it. Gilles Hilary and
210. Joseph V. Carcello, Carl Hollingsworth & Stacy A. Mastrolia, The Effect of PCAOB Inspections
on Big 4 Audit Quality, 23 RSCH. ACCT. REGUL. 85, 86 (2011).
211. Gunny & Zhang, supra note 208, at 137–38.
212. See id. at 139.
213. Id. at 146–48.
214. Lamoreaux, supra note 207, at 314.
215. Id. at 315.
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Clive Lennox demonstrated that audit firm clients tended to react to
peer-review opinions by switching away from auditors with
unfavorable opinions while moving towards auditors with prior
favorable opinions.216 This reaction suggests that the benefits from the
prior peer-review-based inspection system should be excluded through
appropriate methodological tools to determine the marginal benefits of
PCAOB inspections.
The literature on PCAOB inspections includes comparisons of the
pre-PCAOB peer-review regime with the post-SOX PCAOB
inspection regime, finding that the PCAOB regime involves a higher
rate of findings of audit deficiencies. 217 There are a large number of
descriptive statistic studies documenting an increase in
defective-inspection reports, but these studies are largely unhelpful
because they cannot differentiate whether the higher rates of defective
findings represent actual problems with audits or instead merely reflect
a higher propensity on the part of PCAOB inspectors to assert
deficiencies.218 Mona Offermanns and Erik Peek find that investors
respond to deficient PCAOB inspection reports with negative stock
reactions for firm clients. 219 Yet Lennox and Pitman find that the
market shares of audit firms do not change relative to PCAOB audit
report outcomes, which calls into question whether public companies
take them into account.220 They suggest that increased disclosure about
the content of the PCAOB’s inspection results would make the
PCAOB’s inspection regime more valuable. 221
In addition to inspections, the PCAOB on rare occasions brings
enforcement actions that carry large penalties against auditing firms.
One stock price event study of a PCAOB sanction against Deloitte US
for their audit of Ligand Pharmaceuticals found that the sanction was

216. Gilles Hilary & Clive Lennox, The Credibility of Self-Regulation: Evidence from the Accounting
Profession’s Peer Review Program, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 211, 213 (2005).
217. See Abernathy et al., supra note 13, at 50.
218. See id. at 50–51.
219. Mona Offermanns & Erik Peek, Investor Reactions to PCAOB Inspection Reports 10 (Working
Paper, 2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1807994 [https://perma.cc/K2ZMT9AT].
220. Lennox & Pittman, supra note 203, at 98.
221. Id. at 87.
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associated with a negative stock market price reaction across Deloitte’s
publicly traded clients. 222 Empirical examination of the PCAOB’s
enforcement activity is difficult because the small number of
enforcement cases limits the prospect of statistically significant
impacts. It would appear that the PCAOB relies more on intense
inspections than on enforcement actions.
This Subsection’s review of the benefits literature suggests that an
ongoing discussion of the benefits of PCAOB inspections will likely
continue. It appears, however, that as a general matter, the benefits of
PCAOB inspections are clearly demonstrated. This Subsection
suggests that the PCAOB inspection and enforcement process offer
substantial benefits to issuers and that modification of SOX 404(b)
expectations would be a preferred focus for PCAOB cost adjustments
than the inspection process or the enforcement program generally.
In addition to auditing standard setting and inspections, the PCAOB
sets auditor standards for independence to ensure the audit firms
perform their gatekeeper function. 223 Although these standards may
impose minimal costs on issuers, in that issuers may save expenses by
having their auditor also perform accounting–consulting services that
overlap in subject matter, these independence requirements would not
fit well into a regulatory budget, so a detailed analysis of them has not
been provided in this Article. The benefits of independence restrictions
are significant but particularly difficult to measure. The costs of these
requirements are primarily measured as lost profits for auditing firms
themselves, a cost which is irrelevant for purposes of the regulatory
budget offered in this Article.
B. Costs
1. Direct Compliance Costs (with Particular Attention to SOX
Section 404)
This Section considers costs incurred by issuers subject
to SOX 404(b) external audit requirements. First to consider is that
222. Abernathy et al., supra note 13, at 54.
223. See Section 101(d) Order, supra note 1.
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policymakers have prioritized costs to issuers. Second, most costs
associated with SOX 404 are paid by issuers but are a net benefit to
auditing firms. SEC’s Office of Economic Analysis estimated that
SOX 404(b) was associated with a 32% premium in direct audit
fees. 224 Public companies primarily experience SOX 404(a) costs
through higher internal labor and outside vendor costs, while
SOX 404(b) costs are primarily external auditor fees.225 Larger issuers
pay compliance costs of higher magnitude, but smaller issuers’
compliance costs represent a higher percentage of issuer assets.226
In a cost study conducted by the GAO, SOX 404 cost estimates
included direct costs “such as the audit fees, external fees paid to
outside contractors and vendors[,] . . . salaries of internal
staff[,] . . . and nonlabor expenses [like] technology, software, [and]
travel.”227 GAO also considered indirect costs such as “time spent by
management in preparing for and addressing auditors’
inquiries . . . and the diversion of funds from capital investments to
auditor attestation-related expenses.”228 In the first year of SOX 404
compliance, companies between $50 and $150 million market
capitalization spent 0.79% of all their assets on SOX compliance,
whereas companies over $700 million market cap spent only 0.14% of
their assets on compliance with SOX 404 provisions in the first year. 229
The SEC’s Chief Economist conducted a thorough study of SOX
compliance costs that will be highly relevant to this discussion 230 and
the quality of that work further buttresses this Article’s suggestion that
DERA should play a lead role in setting and monitoring the PCAOB’s
regulatory budget. The SEC Chief Economist study noted that surveys
are imperfect, observing that bias could lead some perspectives to be
over- or underrepresented. 231 To control for potential selection and
response bias, the SEC’s 2009 survey eliminated the first and
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
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ninety-ninth percentile responses. 232 It further examined the
characteristics of firms responding to the survey and those failing to
respond and found little difference for firms subject to SOX 404(b).233
The definition of audit fees typically used in these estimates tracks
a SEC requirement that the professional fees paid to the company’s
auditor be reported to the SEC. 234 The 2009 staff study obtained
specific estimates of costs in subcategories such as
SOX 404(b)-related fees, outside vendor fees unrelated to direct audit
fees, number of internal staff hours spent on SOX 404 compliance, and
software, hardware, and travel expenses associated with SOX 404
compliance. 235 In addition to estimates of annual compliance costs,
relative changes in compliance costs can serve an important role in
regulatory budgeting. A wealth of research confirms the SEC 2009
study finding that the transition to AS 5 meaningfully decreased audit
fees.236 The SEC 2009 survey found the 2007 reforms resulted in a
decrease in the mean total SOX 404 compliance costs from $2.87
million pre-reform to $2.33 million post-reform.237 The SEC’s study
of the 2007 reforms found that median direct auditing costs declined
by 23%.238
DERA’s 2009 study specifically found that the 2007 reforms were
associated with a decline in audit fees as follows: (a) for $75 million
to $250 million market capitalization, a 13% decline in average outside
audit fee, a 21.2% decline in outside vendor costs, and a 7% decline in
total SOX 404 compliance costs; (b) for $250 million to $700 million
market capitalization, a 24.2% decline in average outside audit fees, a
24.1% decline in outside vendor costs, and a 7.4% decline in total SOX
404 compliance costs; and (c) for greater than $700 million market
capitalization, a 19.5% decline in average outside audit fees, a 31%

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See id. at 29.
Id. at 29–31, 30 tbl.3.
See id. at 35 n.45.
OFF. OF ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 26, at 38, 43–44 tbl.8, 46–47 tbl.9, 49 tbl.10.
STAFF OF THE OFF. OF THE CHIEF ACCT., supra note 132, at 89.
OFF. OF ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 26, at 4–5.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 15, at 23.
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decline in outside vendor costs, and a 20.9% decline in total SOX 404
compliance costs.239
2. Indirect Costs
One of the arguments typically raised in the context of SOX is that
it is partly responsible for a decrease in the number of firms going
public.240 Forty-four percent of respondents to the SEC’s 2009 survey
indicated that they were considering taking their company private as a
direct result of SOX 404(b) compliance costs. 241 Research has
demonstrated a sizeable increase in the rate at which companies delist
and go private following the adoption of SOX.242 Establishing a causal
link between SOX and the trend of companies going private has been
the subject of much debate in the literature.
The SEC Chief Accountant study found no evidence linking a drop
in U.S. IPOs for firms between $75 million market capitalization and
$250 million market capitalization to the requirement that they obtain
SOX 404 certifications. 243 For example, the Chief Accountant points
to the fact that fewer than five U.S.-based companies raised between
$75 million and $250 million on a foreign market IPO between 2005
and 2010.244 Significant flaws in that analysis were that it only focused
on a comparison to listings in other countries, considered going-dark
transactions (or delisting from public exchanges) for previously public
firms, and failed to consider the prospect that smaller firms are
obtaining private financing and neglecting to go public on either
domestic or foreign markets in the first place. 245 There are various
academic studies generating evidence to either support or counter the
thesis that SOX resulted in a decrease in public company listings in the
United States.246
239. STAFF OF THE OFF. OF THE CHIEF ACCT., supra note 132, at 51–52.
240. See id. at 64 n.102 (quoting Whatever Happened to IPOs?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2011).
241. Id. at 62.
242. Id. at 91.
243. Id. at 4.
244. Id. at 45.
245. STAFF OF THE OFF. OF THE CHIEF ACCT., supra note 132, at 91–93.
246. Jefferson Duarte, Katie Kong, Stephan Siegel & Lance Young, The Impact of the Sarbanes–Oxley
Act on Shareholders and Managers of Foreign Firms, 18 REV. FIN. 417, 417–18 (2014).

Published by Reading Room, 2022

53

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2022], Art. 11

934

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:3

3. Impact on Small Firms
Smaller firms tend to bear the brunt of regulatory costs because they
lack the economies of scale that larger firms might enjoy in regulatory
compliance costs. 247 Much of the recent discussion about SOX 404 has
been over whether to adopt a permanent exemption for SOX 404(b)
for small firms above the threshold of those currently exempt at
between $75 million and $250 million market capitalization. 248 The
SEC’s recent changes added an exemption from SOX 404(b)
requirements for firms that have less than $100 million in annual
revenue.249
Another literature vein suggests that public companies near the $75
million threshold manage their public float to avoid the requirement
that they obtain SOX 404(b) attestations.250 This literature suggests a
revealed preference, which is more reliable than survey-based data,
that firms at the $75 million market capitalization threshold do not
anticipate benefits at the margin from SOX 404(b) attestation. 251
Dhammika Dharmapala conducted a bunching analysis of firms just
above and below the SOX 404(b) compliance thresholds of $75
million and found that they tended to reduce their public float by
roughly $1.7 million solely to avoid SOX 404 attestation. 252 He
equates that to a net expected compliance cost for firms near the
threshold of $4 to $6 million avoided by remaining below the $75
million market capitalization threshold that triggers SOX 404(b)
audits. 253 He finds that this phenomenon continues despite the
decrease in compliance costs resulting from AS 5. 254 This finding
provides even more powerful evidence than firm surveys of their
perception of SOX costs because it reveals the firms’ preference that
247. Johnson et al., supra note 66, at 3.
248. See generally STAFF OF THE OFF. OF THE CHIEF ACCT., supra note 132.
249. Smaller Reporting Companies, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/SRC
[https://perma.cc/4YR9-E2NA] (Feb. 11, 2022).
250. STAFF OF THE OFF. OF THE CHIEF ACCT., supra note 132, at 95.
251. See id. at 95–96.
252. Dhammika Dharmapala, Estimating the Compliance Costs of Securities Regulation: A Bunching
Analysis of Sarbanes–Oxley Section 404(b) 5 (Ctr. for Econ. Stud. & IFO Inst., Working Paper No. 6180,
2016).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 29.
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the benefits of SOX 404(b) compliance exceed the benefits for their
firms.
Peter Iliev finds that SOX 404 resulted in a net decrease in firm
value.255 A number of event studies of the adoption of SOX also found
that that legislation was associated with a decrease in firm value for
firms subject to SOX requirements.256 Iliev finds that the temporary
exemption from SOX 404(b) for small firms (later codified) was
associated with a 4.1% abnormal return for small firms.257 William R.
Kinney, Jr. and Marcy L. Shepardson similarly report that SOX
compliance reduces the value of small companies.258
4. Miscellaneous Costs
One clear effect of the PCAOB’s regulatory activity has been to
increase consolidation in what is already a highly consolidated
auditing industry. As evidence of the level of concentration in the audit
255. Iliev, supra note 194, at 1191.
256. Kate Litvak, The Effect of Sarbanes–Oxley Act on Non-US Companies Cross-Listed in the US, 13
J. CORP. FIN. 195, 195 (2007) (“By comparing reactions of SOX-exposed foreign firms to reactions of
otherwise similar SOX-unexposed foreign firms . . . [Litvak] find[s] that stock prices of foreign firms
subject to SOX declined (increased) significantly, compared to cross-listed firms not subject to SOX and
to non-cross-listed firms, during key announcements indicating that SOX would (would not) fully apply
to cross-listed issuers.”); Ivy Xiying Zhang, Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002,
44 J. ACCT. & ECON. 74, 74 (2007) (“Using concurrent stock returns of non-U.S.-traded foreign firms to
estimate normal U.S. returns, [Zhang] find[s] that U.S. firms experienced a statistically significant
negative cumulative abnormal return around key SOX events. . . . Additional tests show that deferring the
compliance of Section 404, which mandates an internal control test, resulted in significant cost savings
for non-accelerated filers.”); Vidhi Chhaochharia & Yaniv Grinstein, Corporate Governance and Firm
Value: The Impact of the 2002 Governance Rules, 62 J. FIN. 1789, 1789 (2007) (“We find that the
announcement of these rules . . . earn positive abnormal returns compared to firms that are more
compliant. We also find variation in the response across firm size. Large firms that are less compliant earn
positive abnormal returns but small firms that are less compliant earn negative abnormal returns,
suggesting that some provisions are detrimental to small firms.”); Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic &
Eric Talley, Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis, 25
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 107, 107 (2009) (“[W]e examine the post-SOX change in the propensity of American
public targets to be bought by private acquirers rather than public ones with the corresponding change for
foreign public targets, which were outside the purview of SOX. Our findings are consistent with the
hypothesis that SOX induced small firms to exit the public capital market during the year following its
enactment. In contrast, SOX appears to have had little effect on the going-private propensities of larger
firms.”).
257. Iliev, supra note 194, at 1190.
258. Alexander et al., supra note 161, at 271 (citing William R. Kinney, Jr. & Marcy L. Shepardson,
Effects of Alternative SOX Regimes on Audit Fees and Material Weakness Disclosures for Smaller Public
Companies: A Natural Experiment (Working Paper, 2009)).
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market, one GAO report of the audit market concentration showed a
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) (a common measure of market
concentration in antitrust review) of 2,300, which indicates a highly
concentrated market. 259 There is a consensus in the literature that the
advent of the PCAOB led to additional consolidation in an already
consolidated market for audit services, as many smaller auditors left
public company auditing.260Additionally, studies also indicate that a
number of auditing firms with no public company clients nevertheless
voluntarily registered with the PCAOB to signal quality. 261 Further,
Lennox and Pittman find that the worst audit firms, defined as those
with adverse findings in prior peer-review reports and by number of
weaknesses in their prior report, were more likely to withdraw from
public company auditing when mandatory PCAOB registration came
into effect.262
Research on the PCAOB’s Auditing Standard 3, which enhances
documentation requirements, indicates that its results have been mixed
at best. 263 Experimental studies have been used to examine audit
documentation requirements administered by the PCAOB. 264 This
standard is one of the few beyond those adopted pursuant to SOX 404
to receive scrutiny.
VII. PCAOB OPTIONS TO RESPOND TO A NEW REGULATORY BUDGET
After a request for public comment regarding its statutorily required
study of SOX 404 under the Dodd–Frank Act, SEC staff lamented:
“[T]here were few suggestions provided from the public input that
addressed techniques for further reducing the compliance burden while
maintaining investor protections without providing a complete

259. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-163, AUDITS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES: CONTINUED
CONCENTRATION IN AUDIT MARKET FOR LARGE PUBLIC COMPANIES DOES N OT CALL FOR IMMEDIATE
ACTION 16 (2008).
260. See Abernathy et al., supra note 13, at 31.
261. Id. at 34.
262. Lennox & Pittman, supra note 203, at 85.
263. See, e.g., Abernathy et al., supra note 13, at 57.
264. See, e.g., id. at 42.
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exemption.” 265 This Article provides a process reform to advance
regulatory budgeting as a means to more effective oversight of
PCAOB’s operation. This next Section will also offer a number of
discrete reforms the PCAOB could undertake to reduce regulatory
costs.
One suggestion the SEC already received was to have auditors opine
on the design of an internal control process but not test its operation;
another was for auditor attestations on internal controls to occur less
than annually.266 Together, the SEC and PCAOB could further adjust
the probability determination used to define a material weakness in
internal control reviews.267 One critique of the approach implemented
by SOX is that the binary classification of internal controls is
misguided because it assumes that auditors can arrive at an objective
determination that controls are either 100% effective or they are not.268
This critique was suggested before the pending proposal for disclosure
of findings of “significant deficiencies” was suggested; however, the
critique arguing that reviews of internal controls and disclosures could
benefit from a more nuanced approach still stands. 269 The binary
nature of this disclosure interacts in a powerful way with the prospect
of auditing firm litigation exposure because auditors likely find it more
difficult to defend binary determinations than a more nuanced
scale-based determination system. 270
An alternative approach might involve a more nuanced rating
system, in which internal control systems are provided with ratings on
a scale. One analogue that could inform such an approach could be the
rating system used by bank examiners, which they themselves rate the
effectiveness of managerial and financial controls of publicly traded
banks on a scale of 1 to 5. Parveen P. Gupta and Tim Leech suggested
another intermediate type of audit: replacing SOX 404(b) audits,
which replicate work already done by management, with an external

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
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Id. at 78.
Id. at 82–83.
Gupta & Leech, supra note 8, at 31.
Id. at 37–38.
Id. at 32.
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audit of management’s internal-controls review process.271 Whether
this reform would prove effective depends on whether the PCAOB and
the auditing profession would implement such a shift as a compliance
cost-control measure or whether processes embodied in SOX 404(b)
processes migrate over under a new guise. Alternatively, an exemption
from SOX 404(b) attestation requirements for a larger class of firms
than those currently exempt would still remain subject to other SOX
requirements like SOX 404(a) certifications by management. An
issuer exempt from SOX 404(b)’s requirement of an external control
attestation will still see its SOX 404(a) representations subject to the
review of an ordinary outside audit. 272
Individuals proffering comment to the SEC have previously urged
the SEC to become more involved in the development of the COSO
framework.273 SEC rules and PCAOB auditing standards require that
management base its determinations about the effectiveness of its
internal controls on a generally accepted internal control framework.
Although the PCAOB does not mandate the use of a particular
framework, it strongly suggests using the COSO framework first
developed in 1992.274 The PCAOB as an institution has a seat at the
table for COSO deliberations and thus can play a role in reducing costs
for managers who choose to use that framework. 275
One simple way for the PCAOB to come into compliance with a
regulatory budget would be to eliminate duplicative activity mirroring
compliance audits undertaken by other regulators—such as FINRA
compliance inspections for broker-dealers or bank examinations for
chartered banks and bank holding companies—through the
establishment of more concrete principles whereby auditors can rely
on reports from those sources to conduct their reviews under the
risk-based framework that now governs internal control attestations.
271. Id. at 42.
272. See Vishal A. Munsif & Meghna Singhvi, Internal Control Reporting and Audit Fees of
Non-Accelerated Filers, 15 J. ACCT. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 901, 905 (2014).
273. STAFF OF THE OFF. OF THE CHIEF ACCT., supra note 132, at 6.
274. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 15, at 11.
275. COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N, INTERNAL CONTROL – INTEGRATED
FRAMEWORK, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i, ii (2013), https://www.coso.org/documents/990025p-executivesummary-final-may20.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQ5Q-RFQC].
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To the extent auditors are not able to access documents from those
sources, the PCAOB could work with the SEC and with the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council to obtain limited access to
information, otherwise kept confidential by bank regulators as
confidential supervisory information, to reduce the costs of internal
auditing and external auditing certification.
The SEC should also consider that its guidance and interpretive
releases can provide secondary legal authority to federal courts tasked
with adjudicating cases of auditing firm liability in private securities
class actions that include auditing firms as clients. Furthermore, the
SEC General Counsel’s practice of providing amicus briefs in
securities class actions at the district-court level and on
appeal—including cases in which auditing firms are
defendants—should be considered a powerful component of the
PCAOB regulatory budget process. The prospect of auditing firm
securities class action liability serves as a powerful lens, which greatly
magnifies the regulatory costs of PCAOB regulations. The SEC clearly
has multiple avenues it can use to mitigate and thereby impact
PCAOB’s ability to achieve compliance with its regulatory cost
allocation by using its own regulatory tools to reduce the liability risk
that auditors face.
CONCLUSION
Regulatory budgeting like its conceptual cousin, cost–benefit
analysis, seeks to operationalize a process to force regulators to
consider the unavoidable role that tradeoffs play in economic
decisions. This Article has provided a roadmap for the SEC to begin
to track the regulatory apparatus at the PCAOB in a more transparent
and systematic fashion. The roadmap would allow the SEC to continue
the process of refining and attenuating the PCAOB’s approach to
implementing its mandate under SOX, as it attempted to do in a
one-time and rough-cut manner in the move from AS 2 to AS 5.
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